SOPhiA

4th Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy

2013

Programme and Abstracts

Contents

Preface

In recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy has increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.

In 2013, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organizers, the contributors and the conference's guiding principles. To avoid misunderstandings we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, Salzburg stands for the location of the conference only, not for the nationality of its participants. (ii) One of the conference's distinctive feature compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.

By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in the framework of Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:

> "*The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer*

undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of philosophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the one unified science."

In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interesting conference, fruitful discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organization Committee

Figures and Facts

Timeframe and general information. From September 12th-14th 2013 the fourth Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA 2013) will be held at the University of Salzburg's Faculty of Catholic Theology. The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official languages of the conference are English and German. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The organizers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.

Mission statement. Within the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. A topical focus is not intended. The conference therefore has no specific theme. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate some of the problems of philosophy and to provide critical assessments of them. No individual is expected to construct "a whole building of philosophy" all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward "at his specific place within" philosophy.

Procedure. About 120 participants are expected. There will be 75 talks. The speakers are from institutions of the following states: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, The Netherlands, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA. There are three types of talks:

Plenary talks: held by invited speakers

Talks within a workshop: held by invited speakers

Talks within sections: held by contributed speakers

Speakers. Invited speakers are:

Catarina Dutilh-Novaes (University of Groningen): *The Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Deductive Reasoning as Cultural Phenomena*

Ole T. Hjortland (MCMP, LMU Munich): *Proof Theoretic Harmony With Higher-Order Rules*

Martin Kusch (University of Vienna): *Pluralism in Science*

Herlinde Pauer-Studer (University of Vienna): *Kantian Contractualism and the Separation between the Moral and the Political*

Affiliated Workshop: *Mathematical Philosophy*

Peter Brössel (University of Bochum): *Formal Epistemology*

Catarina Dutilh-Novaes (University of Groningen): *Philosophy of Logic: Squeezing Arguments*

Ole T. Hjortland (MCMP, LMU Munich): *An Introduction to Non-Classical Logics*

Johannes Korbmacher (MCMP, LMU Munich): *Mathematical Metaphysics*

Hans-Christoph Kotzsch (MCMP, LMU Munich): *A Categorical Framework for Algebraic Semantics*

The list of contributed speakers and their abstracts can be found on the following pages.

Programme

September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)

Time	Location			
	HS 101	**HS 104**	**HS 105**	**HS 107**
09:00-12:45	**Affiliated Workshop: Mathematical Philosophy** Peter Brössel & Catarina Dutilh-Novaes & Ole T. Hjortland & Johannes Korbmacher & Hans-Christoph Kotzsch *Mathematical Philosophy* Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger (English, Location: HS 101)			
12:45-14:00	Lunch Break			
14:00-15:30	**Plenary Lecture** Catarina Dutilh-Novaes *The Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Deductive Reasoning as Cultural Phenomena* Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger (English, Location: HS 101)			
15:30-16:00	Break			
16:00-16:30	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Marco Simionato *Might there Be an Empty World?* Chair: Alberto Tassoni (English)	**Ethics & Political Philosophy** Bastian Reichardt *Normative Wesen in einer natürlichen Welt* Chair: Marcel Warmt (German)	**Philosophy of Science** Michael Schippers *Generalising Logical Concepts: Partial Entailment and Partial Equivalence* Chair: Carlo Maria Cirino (English)	**Philosophy of Religion** Iurii Kozik *Why Should the Problem of Religious Disagreement be Taken Seriously?* Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)
16:45-17:15	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Joshua Babic *How to Populate an Ontology: Geach vs Quine* Chair: Alberto Tassoni (English)	**Ethics & Political Philosophy** Frauke Albersmeier *Zum Speziesismus technisierender Fachsprache* Chair: Marcel Warmt (German)	**Philosophy of Science** Argun Abrek Canbolat *Superluminal or Not: A Contemporary Debate Re-analysed* Chair: Carlo Maria Cirino (English)	**Philosophy of Religion** Christian J. Feldbacher & Laurenz Hudetz *Automatic Metaphor Interpretation Applied to the Argumentation of New Atheists* Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)
17:30-18:00	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Rafal Wodzisz *On Rudolf Carnap's Aufbau and its Interpretations* Chair: Alberto Tassoni (English)	**Ethics & Political Philosophy** Dorothea Kotalik *Wie ist Autonomie am Lebensende möglich?* Chair: Marcel Warmt (German)	**Philosophy of Science** Florian Boge *Are Quantum Probabilities Merely Epistemic?* Chair: Carlo Maria Cirino (English)	**Philosophy of Religion** Marco Benasso *Der (glitschige) Fels des Atheismus - neuere probabilistische Überlegungen zum Theodizeeproblem* Chair: Alexander Gebharter (German)
18:15-	Warm buffet at the Faculty of Catholic Theology			

September 13th, 2013 (Friday)

Time	Location			
	HS 101	**HS 104**	**HS 105**	**HS 107**
09:00-10:30	**Plenary Lecture** Ole T. Hjortland *Proof Theoretic Harmony With Higher-Order Rules* Chair: Albert J.J. Anglberger (English, Location: HS 101)			
10:30-10:45	Short Break			
10:45-11:15	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Jonathan Lukic *Das Quine'sche Ontologiekriterium* Chair: Florian Fischer (German)	**Ethics & Political Philosophy** Stefan Leber *Practical Reasoning and the Normative (In)Significance of Desires* Chair: Hendrik Kempt (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Carlo Maria Cirino *Epistemology of Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD): neurodevelopment of sociality and importance of counterfactuals* Chair: Florian Boge (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Theresa Marx *Was ist ein rationaler Sprecher?* Chair: Alexander auf der Straße (German)
11:30-12:00	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Zack Al-Witri *Prevention and Production* Chair: Florian Fischer (English)	**Ethics & Political Philosophy** Julia Apollonia Engels *Is Pain Humiliating? - On the Relation between Dignity and Pain* Chair: Hendrik Kempt (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Alexander G. Mirnig *Bending the Rules ... and why it might not always be a bad thing* Chair: Florian Boge (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Inga Bones *Ist das Sorites-Paradox ein Scheinproblem?* Chair: Alexander auf der Straße (German)
12:15-12:45	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Luca Gili *A New Account of Aristotelian Endurantism* Chair: Florian Fischer (English)	**Ethics & Political Philosophy** Viktor Ivankovic *The Metric of Equality and Utility* Chair: Hendrik Kempt (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Alexander Christian *Zur Rationalität der Pflicht zum Whistleblowing in der Wissenschaft* Chair: Florian Boge (German)	**Philosophy of Language** Adam Kubiak *On How did Russell Underestimate Frege* Chair: Alexander auf der Straße (English)
12:45-14:00	Lunch Break			

September 13th, 2013 (Friday)

Time	Location			
	HS 101	**HS 104**	**HS 105**	**HS 107**
12:45-14:00	Lunch Break			
14:00-14:30	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Ben Hsien-pin Liao *Priority Monism and Time* Chair: Luca Gili (English)	**Ethics & Political Philosophy** Tobias Gutmann *Welche Rollen spielen moralische Prinzipien?* Chair: Julia Apollonia Engels (German)	**Epistemology** Andreas Joecks *Reichenbach und das konstitutive apriori* Chair: Sebastian Kletzl (German)	**Philosophy of Language** Johannes Marti *Two-Dimensionalism and Interpretation* Chair: Theresa Marx (English)
14:45-15:15	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Alberto Tassoni *Presentism Entails the Stage View* Chair: Luca Gili (English)	**Ethics & Political Philosophy** Hendrik Kempt *Moralische Kompromisse* Chair: Julia Apollonia Engels (German)	**Epistemology** Charles Côté-Bouchard *A Challenge to Epistemic Non-Cognitivism* Chair: Sebastian Kletzl (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Jonathan Mai *Two-Dimensionalism and Propositions* Chair: Theresa Marx (English)
15:30-16:00	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Johannes Grössl *Transtemporal Reference for Presentism* Chair: Luca Gili (English)	**Ethics & Political Philosophy** Marcel Warmt *Konsequentialismus: Eine Drei-Ebenen-Theorie* Chair: Julia Apollonia Engels (German)	**Epistemology** Gabriele Ferretti *Externalism, Enactive Approach and Canonic Neurons* Chair: Sebastian Kletzl (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Alexander auf der Straße *A Nice Arrangement of Non-Literal Meanings* Chair: Theresa Marx (English)
16:00-16:30	Break			
16:30-18:00	**Plenary Lecture** Herlinde Pauer-Studer *Kantian Contractualism and the Separation between the Moral and the Political* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English, Location: HS 101)			
18:15-	Warm buffet at the Faculty of Catholic Theology			

September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)

Time	Location			
	HS 101	**HS 104**	**HS 105**	**HS 107**
09:00-09:30	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Antje Rumberg *Real Possibilities and Potentialities* Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English)	**Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics** Christian Wimmer *Freie W-Logik* Chair: Christine Schurz (German)	**Epistemology** Andreas Mueller *Knowledge and Practical Reasoning* Chair: Martha Cassidy-Brinn (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Francesco Marchi *Attention and Cognitive Penetration in Visual Consciousness* Chair: Tae-Kyung Kim (English)
09:45-10:15	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Aleksandar Simić *Incongruent Counterparts and Enantiomorphism* Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English)	**Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics** Matteo Pascucci *A System of Temporal Logic with Operators of Contingency* Chair: Christine Schurz (English)	**Epistemology** Péter Hartl *Yablo, Modal Scepticism and the "Dialectics" of Conceivability* Chair: Martha Cassidy-Brinn (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Kinga Jeczminska *The Hard Problem of Consciousness* Chair: Tae-Kyung Kim (English)
10:30-11:00	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Florian Fischer *The Logic of Dispositions* Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English)	**Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics** Anna Maria Karczewska *An Exemplar of a Postional Approach to Temporal Logic* Chair: Christine Schurz (English)	**Epistemology** Dejan Makovec *Intuition: Culture and Credit* Chair: Martha Cassidy-Brinn (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Lovro Savić *Fictionalism and Philosophy of Psychiatry* Chair: Tae-Kyung Kim (English)
11:15-11:45	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Riccardo Pinosio *Prolegomena for a Kantian Formal Theory of Space* Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English)	**Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics** Leonard Geerdink *Can Logic be Conceived of as a Competence Theory for Thought?* Chair: Christine Schurz (English)	**Epistemology** Yven Johannes Leist *Knowledge and the Problem of Transparency* Chair: Martha Cassidy-Brinn (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Sebastian Müller *The Fatal Flaw in Chalmers' Argument Against Materialism* Chair: Tae-Kyung Kim (English)
11:45-12:15	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Thorben Petersen *Augustine's Question and The Case of Sounds* Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English)	**Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics** Andrea Tenuta *Revisiting Brouwer - Minimal Intuitionism* Chair: Christine Schurz (English)	**Epistemology** Sebastian Kletzl *Testimony and Instruments* Chair: Martha Cassidy-Brinn (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Martin Maga *Kollektive Intentionalität als Integrierte Information* Chair: Sebastian Müller (German)
12:15-12:45		**Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics** Thomas Schindler *Truth and Diagonalization* Chair: Christine Schurz (English)	**Epistemology** Michel Croce *Reconsidering Testimonial Knowledge: A Virtuous-Contextualist Account* Chair: Martha Cassidy-Brinn (English)	
12:45-14:00	Lunch Break			

September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)

Time	Location			
	HS 101	**HS 104**	**HS 105**	**HS 107**
12:45-14:00	Lunch Break			
14:00-14:30	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Lorenzo Azzano *Powerful Objects: For a Safe and Sane Ontology of Modality* Chair: Thorben Petersen (English)	**History of Logic & Argumentation Theory** Ulrich Lobis *Die Logik der Stoa* Chair: Christian Wimmer (German)	**Epistemology** Jakob Koscholke *Stability à la Douven & Meijs* Chair: Dejan Makovec (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Matthias Rolffs *Die kausale Exklusion des Mentalen* Chair: Sebastian Müller (German)
14:45-15:15	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Adam Andrzejewski *Artification, Artworks and Ontology* Chair: Thorben Petersen (English)	**History of Logic & Argumentation Theory** Alexander Samans *Freges Kritik am Psychologismus und Kants transzendentaler Idealismus* Chair: Christian Wimmer (German)	**Epistemology** Marco Marletta *Styles of Scientific Reasoning and Pluralist Theories of Truth* Chair: Dejan Makovec (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Natalia Anna Pietrulewicz *Alief and Experimental Philosophy* Chair: Sebastian Müller (English)
15:30-16:00	**Metaphysics & Ontology** Marta Zareba *On Donald Davidson's Theory of Action Individuation* Chair: Thorben Petersen (English)	**History of Logic & Argumentation Theory** Iuliia Krisheminska *Contemporary Attitudes Towards Toulmin's Model* Chair: Christian Wimmer (English)	**Epistemology** Martha Cassidy-Brinn *The Epistemic Value of Mastery* Chair: Dejan Makovec (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Tae-Kyung Kim *Colours, Animals and Contents - Is there Non-Conceptual Content?* Chair: Sebastian Müller (English)
16:00-16:30	Break			
16:30-18:00	**Plenary Lecture** Martin Kusch *Pluralism in Science* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English, Location: HS 101)			
18:15-	Closing Dinner			

Universitätsplatz

HS105

Conference Office

HS104

Furtwänglerpark

HS107

HS101

Courtyard of the
Main Library

Hofstallgasse

Venue: Universitätsplatz 1

Abstracts & Biographical Notes

Prevention and Production

Zack Al-Witri

It is commonplace to speak of the nonoccurrence of an event (an absence) as causing something or being caused, and it is explanatory in many scientific contexts. However, absences are ghostly entities; what doesn't happen surely doesn't participate in causal relations, pushing and pulling things so to speak. If they can't be produced or brought about, then how is prevention and omission possible? Most leading accounts of the causal relevance of absences take it to be a matter of counterfactual dependence, conceiving of absences as difference-makers rather than causal producers. Thus a disjunctive view of causation is espoused; "two concepts" of causation are needed. Unfortunately, difference-making accounts of prevention and omissions do not handle cases of overprevention, preemptive prevention and omissive overdetermination. After showing the failure of extant, sophisticated difference-making accounts, this paper proposes a way to make sense of absences in terms of facts about causal production in a way that does not require two concepts of causations. Ultimately, to prevent an event e is to bring about some other event that is incompatible with the production of e.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Florian Fischer
Date:	11:30-12:00, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Zack Al-Witri (Columbia University, USA)
Zack Al-Witri. MA Columbia University 2011. BA St Andrews 2010. Works on metaphysics of causation and laws.
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Zum Speziesismus technisierender Fachsprache

Frauke Albersmeier

ie Verwendung technisierender Fachsprache in der biomedizinischen Forschung kann in einigen Fällen als speziesistisch kritisiert werden, wenn beispielsweise entindividualisierend von Modellorganismen wie Mus musculus gesprochen wird. Speziesismus meint dabei grundsätzlich eine voreingenommene Haltung zugunsten der Mitglieder der eigenen Spezies bzw. ein diskriminierendes Verhalten gegenüber Mitgliedern anderer Spezies. In meinem Vortrag werde ich ausgehend von einer Analyse des Terminus Speziesismus in zentralen Texten der tierethischen Diskussion seit 1975 eine Definition vorschlagen, die (i) zur Identifikation moralisch relevanter Probleme beitragen kann und (ii) der Entwicklung von wertneutraler Fachsprache dient. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass das Maß an Technisierung durch Terminologisierung als illegitim bewertet werden kann, wenn ethische Probleme durch die Verwendung von technical terms verschleiert werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund werde ich die Übernahme bestimmter naturwissenschaftlicher Termini im Kontext tier- und medizinethischer Diskussionen als rechtfertigungstheoretisches Problem kennzeichnen.

Section:	Ethics & Political Philosophy
Language:	German
Chair:	Marcel Warmt
Date:	16:45-17:15, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 104

Frauke Albersmeier (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)
Frauke Albersmeier (B.A.). Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf. 2011 Bachelor of Arts, Kulturwissenschaften; derzeit Masterarbeit zu Problemen des Speziesismus-Begriffs in der Tierethik.
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Artification, Artworks and Ontology

Adam Andrzejewski

The aim of this paper is to show that the ontology of artworks, as traditionally understood, may draw valuable theoretical inspiration from the latest manifestations of artistic activities which often go beyond art traditionally recognised as such by the institutional art world. Artification, that is combining art with non-art, is an example of this phenomenon. The goal is achieved in three steps.

First, the concept of artification is presented and clarified. I analyze Ossi Naukkarinen's definition of artification and reformulate it in a more clear manner by establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for artification's occurrence. Second, the structure of artified objects is revealed and motivated by comparing then with artworks involving non-art elements. As a result, it is argued that the artified objects gain their art-like status due to a physical and aesthetic integrity with the initial artworks. Finally, the last step provides information how the consideration over artification is useful and inspiring for the ontology of traditional artworks. I list and justify two such inspirations: (i) possibility of substantial change of artworks over time, and, (ii) reconsideration of what is artwork's matter and differentiate it from artwork's medium.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Thorben Petersen
Date:	14:45-15:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 101

Adam Andrzejewski (University of Warsaw, Poland)
Adam Andrzejewski (MPhil). University of Warsaw. 2011 master in philosophy. Currently a PhD candidate and research assistant at the Department of Philosophy. His thesis is devoted to ontology of artworks. Publications in analytical aesthetics and ontology.
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Powerful Objects: For a Safe and Sane Ontology of Modality

Lorenzo Azzano

I n contemporary metaphysics the opinion is gaining strength that powers, dispositions, are ontologically respectable properties. As potential for changes, powers thus seem suitable for the explanation of (at least) physical possibility and necessity. "Modal dispositionalism", as we may call this position, is thus to be understood as both an actualist and naturalist ontology of modality.

Roughly speaking, what is possible is what something is disposed to manifest. However, a dilemma lies ahead. Possibility is usually understood as a sentential operator - that is to say, to be subject to modalizations are property instances by objects (fact/state of affairs). However, that a property instance is possible does not entail that it exists, so powers cannot be directed to property instances on a relational framework of powers: in fact, all relata of a relation must exist.

It thus seems that either modal dispositionalism is committed to inexistent possibilia (the property instances unmanifested powers are related to), or either it will be unable to countenance at least some de dicto possibilities - those, like the ones with flexible designators, that cannot be translated back to de re possibilities.

I claim that a theory of dispositions in which a power's manifestation is a property-type (a universal) can solve this dilemma by dispelling its second horn; on this proposal, the primary bearers of modal properties are empowered objects rather than abstract state of affairs, or non-actual facts about counterparts; as a consequence, possibility is best understood as a predicate operator, rather than a sentence operator.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Thorben Petersen
Date:	14:00-14:30, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 101

Lorenzo Azzano (Milan, Italy)

Lorenzo Azzano graduated from San Raffaele University (Milan) with a thesis on metaphysics. His primary interest is the theory of dispositions, causation, laws of nature and modality; He is currently working on a dispositional grounding of (at least physical) possibility and necessity. He spent the Trinity Term 2013 at Oxford with the Power Structuralist group of Anna Marmodoro, Corpus Christi College, in order to further develop his proposal. He is currently looking for a PhD program to enroll to.

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How to Populate an Ontology: Geach vs Quine

Joshua Babic

According to Quine (1948), ontology is about what there is. The ontological question can be asked in three words -What is there?- and can be answered in just one word: Everything. Everybody will accept this answer as true, yet to make up an ontology is not a trivial task because there is room for disagreement over cases: a nominalist will disagree with a platonist about the existence of mathematical entities such as sets and numbers, a nihilist will disagree with a universalist wheter there are any composite objects. They will not disagree that there is what there is, namely everything; they will disagree about how much "everything" amounts. Though Quine in his famous paper "On what there is" didn't give us a list of entities that exist; he set up the ontological question, helping himself with the meaning of the existential quantifier, and he provided a methodology for the ontological inquiry. It's quite clear that "On what there is" doesn't really talk about what there is; it is an essay about how to say that there is something. He was doing metaontology. Quine's approach to ontological inquiry influenced many philosophers and the disputants of

an ontological dispute that don't accept this approach will be suspected of muddled and obscure thinking; but in the recent years some post-Quinean philosophers, such as Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer, have radically criticized Quine and his metaontology. In this presentation I will evaluate Peter Thomas Geach's criticism toward Quine's approach to ontological inquiry (1951) and I will argue that the way by which ontology should be practiced depends on the sense we attribute to the expressions "existence", "exists", "there is/are". If according to Geach ontology can't be reduced to listing entities, then how to make up a good ontology? Is Geach giving an alternative? Is it so wrong to mix sense-datas, physical objects, possibilities, abstract objects in the same list, the list of "what there is"? My plan is to briefly cast some light on some concepts used by Quine and Geach using a modern terminology; then I will find out differences and similarities between the two philosophers about metaontology; at last I will try to scrutinize over the connection between ontology and metaontology: does my ontology affect the second-order issue of how to practice ontology, or does my second-order issue of how to practice ontology affect an ontology?

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Alberto Tassoni
Date:	16:45-17:15, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Joshua Babic (Institute of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Lugano, Switzerland)
Joshua Babic. Isfi, Faculty of Theology, Lugano. Undergraduate student. 2012 High School Diploma in Classical Studies.
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Der (glitschige) Fels des Atheismus - neuere probabilistische Überlegungen zum Theodizeeproblem

Marco Benasso

Die Erfahrung von Schmerz und Leid ist so erschreckend wie alltäglich und dementsprechend stark ist die Intuition, dies müsse gegen die Existenz eines moralisch vollkommenen Gottes sprechen. Das Problem ist alt und berechtigt, doch ist es bis heute nicht gelungen, eine befriedigende Formulierung des Problems des Übels zu geben. Im Vortrag möchte ich drei Ansätze charakterisieren, die heute maßgeblich die analytische Diskussion in der Religionsphilosophie prägen.

1) Starke Unvereinbarkeitsargumente, nach denen die Existenz Gottes und die Existenz des Übels logisch unvereinbar sind. Diese deduktiven Formulierungen wurden bald wieder verworfen, weil ihre Ansprüche zu hoch waren und Alvin Plantingas "Free-Will-Defense" als die theistische Standardantwort auf das sogenannte "logical problem of evil" tradiert wird.

2) Schwache Unvereinbarkeitsargumente, nach denen die Existenz des Übels die Existenz Gottes unwahrscheinlich macht. Die klassischen Versionen von William Rowe waren nicht befriedigend, weil sie induktiv zu schwach sind. In jüngster Zeit hat Michael Tooley ein noch wenig beachtetes induktives Argument vorgestellt, welches den gleichen induktiven Generalisierungsschluss enthält wie Rowe, aber wesentlich stärker die Konklusion stützt.

3) Bayesianische Formulierungen, nach denen die Existenz von Leiden in der Welt viel eher unter Annahme einer naturalistischen Hypothese zu erwarten ist. Daher sei diese der Hypothese des Theismus vorzuziehen. Solche Formulierungen sind vielversprechend, wobei kritisch gefragt werden muss, ob Theismus und Naturalismus sachgemäß als wissenschaftliche Hypothesen behandelt werden können, oder ob ihr "großräumiger Charakter" dies verbietet.

Die Schwierigkeiten, ein schlagkräftiges Argument aus dem Übel gegen den Theismus zu formulieren dürfen selbstverständlich nicht über die Relevanz des Problems für eine rationale Rechtfertigung des Glaubens hinwegtäuschen, um die jeder Theist bemüht sein sollte.

❧

Marco Benasso (University of Innsbruck, Austria)
Marco Benasso (Mag.phil.fac.theol.), Universität Innsbruck, 2009
Diplomstudium Christliche Philosophie, DA über Alvin Plantingas
"Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism". Dissertationsprojekt
im Bereich der Religionsphilosophie zur Rationalität des Theismus an-
gesichts der natürlichen Übel.
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Are Quantum Probabilities Merely Epistemic?

Florian Boge

In Quantum Mechanics (QM), the state of an isolated sys-
tem is described by a state function (or state vector) $|\psi>$.
This state function describes the system as being in a super-
position of different definite states with respect to a certain
class of observable properties. From this state function one can de-
rive the probability of measuring each definite value of the system for
a given observable in a respective measurement procedure. Standard
interpretations of QM consider these state functions to be complete de-
scriptions of a system's state. Hence on this kind of an account, under
certain circumstances the system has no definite value for any of its
observables.

From its very beginnings, QM has been subject to considerable
doubt and criticism (famously also by Albert Einstein; cf. Einstein
Podolski and Rosen 1935), and attempts have been made to interpret
its astonishing features (such as superposition) as mere reflections of in-
complete knowledge. One such approach to QM, often simply referred

to as the statistical interpretation, is quite widespread throughout modern textbooks (cf. Grifftiths 1995). But more recently, approaches from Quantum Information Theory also attempt to give credence to the epistemic view of quantum states. One particular examlple is the Spekkens toy model approach, which presents a model of incomplete knowledge and then gives a numer of analogies to QM (cf. Spekkens 2007; Harrigan and Spekkens 2010).

However, three powerful arguments exist that weaken this approach: the famous theorem by John Bell (1964), the (not much less famous) Kochen-Specker Theorem (1967), and the recently developed argument by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR Argument) (2012). Bell's Theorem shows that any interpretation of QM which attempts to explain its odd features in terms of hidden variables (and hence in terms of incomplete knowledge) has to be non-local; i.e.: there has to be a special kind of connection between certain types of quantum systems (entangled quantum systems) which enables them to communicate at a speed faster than the speed of light. This, however, leads to a conflict with the special theory of relativity which does not permitt such communication. The Kochen-Specker Theorem shows that any such interpretation has to be contextual, i.e., the outcome of measuring a certain observable will in some cases depend on which other observables it is measured with. Finally, the PBR Argument suggests that if quantum states would be a reflection of incomplete knowledge, there should be the possibility of overlaps in the probability distributions corresponding to two distinct quantum states $|\psi(0)>$ and $|\psi(1)>$. This assumption can be shown to lead to a contradiction with the predictions of quantum mechanics.

It is crucial to note that bell's theorem (or, more precisely, its key ingredient, the violation of Bell-type inequalities) has been tested experimentally.

Furthermore, PBR offer a suggestion of how to test for the implications of their theorem as well.

I will argue that those three arguments suffice to render the epistemic approach to quantum states futile, as the virtue of such an approach lies in explaining the counter-intuitive features of QM away. Since this cannot be done, QM must be taken to reveal something important and profound about the foundations of the physical world. This in turn suggests that the philosophic implications of QM should be taken seriously and a clear interpretation of quantum

states must be of key interest to philosophers of science and ontologists.

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Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Carlo Maria Cirino
Date:	17:30-18:00, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 105

Florian Boge (Universität zu Köln, Germany)
Florian Boge is a PhD student in Philosophy and an undergraduate student in Physics at the University of Cologne. He finished his M.A. study in Philosophy in 2012 with a thesis on trope ontology an similarity relations. He has since taught several undergraduate classes on epistemology, ontology and the philosophy of science at the University of Düsseldorf. He ist currently working on the philosophic questions raised by quantum mechanics. His main interest is in the relation between quantum mechanics and the question of reality.
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Ist das Sorites-Paradox ein Scheinproblem?

Inga Bones

Das Sorites-Paradox ist eines der in den vergangenen vierzig Jahren meistdiskutierten Probleme der theoretischen Philosophie, welches insbesondere in der analytisch geprägten Philosophie eine Flut von Veröffentlichungen angestoßen hat. Doch obwohl mit der Anzahl der Veröffentlichungen auch die formale Raffinesse in der Ausarbeitung einer Antwort auf das Paradox kontinuierlich zugenommen hat, präsentiert sich die gegenwärtige Forschungslandschaft als überaus fragmentiert - dominiert von einer Reihe konkurrierender Ansätze, von denen keiner einen entscheidenden Vorteil gegenüber seinen Mitbewerbern zu besitzen scheint.

Aus einer wittgensteinschen Perspektive drängt sich die Frage auf, ob es sich bei Sorites-Paradoxien lediglich um Scheinprobleme handeln könnte, deren Anziehungskraft in der mangelnden Übersicht über unseren Sprachgebrauch begründet ist - denn soritische Argumente weisen eine nach Wittgenstein für philosophische Rätsel charakteristische Struktur auf: "Es ist doch nicht so!" sagen wir. "Aber es muß doch so sein!" (PU Par.112). Mein Beitrag beantwortet die titelgebende Frage mit einem klaren "Jein". Das Sorites-Paradox weist Züge eines Scheinproblems auf, weil es, sofern es als logisches Problem im Mittelpunkt philosophischer Anstrengungen steht, die falsche Art von Fragen und Lösungsansätzen provoziert. Andererseits stoßen uns Sorites-Paradoxien auf eine Reihe fundamentaler Fragen nach dem Wesen und der Beziehung natürlicher und formaler Sprachen, die es zu verfolgen lohnt.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	German
Chair:	Alexander auf der Straße
Date:	11:30-12:00, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

Inga Bones (FAU Erlangen, Karlsruhe)
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A Challenge to Epistemic Non-Cognitivism

Charles Côté-Bouchard

wo fundamental questions are at the centre of contemporary
metaethics. First, are moral judgements truth-apt? In other
words, do they express cognitive states aiming at accurately
representing an independent moral reality (i.e., moral beliefs)
or are they expressions of non-cognitive states like feelings or desires?
Second, even if we accept that moral judgements express beliefs, there
is still the question whether there even is an independent reality that
makes some of these beliefs true. In other words, are there moral facts
or properties? "Yes", says the moral realist; "no", says the moral anti-
realist.

Hence it is with morality and its status that metaethics is concerned.
However, morality does not exhaust the "ought" part of the "is/ought"
distinction. Not only do we think that there are things that we morally
ought to do, but we also make judgements about what we ought or
have reasons to do from a non-moral point of view. For example, we
think that we ought not to smoke if we want to stay healthy or that the
fact that one wants to teach philosophy is a reason to get a philosophy
degree. We also make judgements about what we ought or have reasons
to believe or feel. For example, we judge that the fact that the streets
are wet is a reason to believe that it rained earlier, or that the fact
that a tiger is jumping towards me is a reason for me to be afraid.
What these judgements have in common is that they are "normative",
i.e., they are judgements to the effect that a certain consideration calls

for, counts in favour, or justifies a certain response (an action, a belief or an emotion). Thus moral judgements are only one species of the normative judgements genus, and morality is only one among many normative domains.

Given that, there is no reason to examine only the status of morality, and not that of other normative domains. Despite the special importance that morality probably has to us, other species of normative judgements are still essential to our lives. After all, it is hard to even imagine going one hour without taking something to be a reason to do, believe, or feel something. Hence we should not only ask whether moral cognitivism and realism are true, but also whether cognitivism and realism about other species of normativity are true. In other words, we should not only do metaethics as it is traditionally conceived, but also what could be called "the metaethics" of other normative domains.

I will be concerned with the metaethics of one normative domain in particular: that of reasons for belief. I will refer to that inquiry as the "metaethics of belief". In parallel with traditional metaethics, I will take the main questions of the metaethics of belief to be whether or not we should accept cognitivism and realism about reasons for belief or, as I will call them, "epistemic cognitivism" and "epistemic realism" respectively.

This paper has two aims. The first is to explain more precisely what I take the metaethics of belief to consist in, and why it has special importance for epistemology. Denying the existence of reasons for belief, I contend, leads to a kind of scepticism about epistemic justification and knowledge. The second is to lay some ground in one particular debate in the metaethics of belief, namely the one between epistemic cognitivism and epistemic non-cognitivism. More precisely, I want to raise a challenge against epistemic non-cognitivism, i.e., the thesis according to which judgements concerning reasons for belief express conative states that have a world-to-mind direction of fit, and hence that cannot be true or false. Although I will not provide a direct refutation of that view, my strategy will be to question the positive case for adopting it.

Here is a preview of my argument. Given that normative judgements have all the appearances of cognitive thought and discourse, we need a strong positive motivation for rejecting the appearances and claiming that they actually express non-cognitive states that cannot be true or false. In the case of moral judgements, non-cognitivists can

invoke the two following related considerations. First, they can argue that since moral judgements are intrinsically motivating and beliefs alone do not motivate, moral non-cognitivism has to be true. Second, they can appeal to the fact that moral non-cognitivism can easily explain the "practicality" of moral judgement, i.e., its close, if not essential, link with motivation and emotions. The problem for epistemic non-cognitivism is that it cannot invoke any of these two considerations. First, believing in accordance with judgements about reasons for belief never involves motivation. In short, this is because judging that there is sufficient reason to believe that P amounts to believing that P. Moreover, epistemic judgements, unlike moral ones, do not have a particular "practical" aspect in need of explaining. It follows that epistemic non-cognitivism is faced with a pressing challenge: if epistemic judgements are not motivating or practical, what positive theoretical advantage is there to reject the apparent truth-aptness of epistemic discourse, and adopt epistemic non-cognitivism in the first place?

One feature of this challenge is that it would still hold if (1) objections to the tenability of non-cognitivism failed, and (2) moral non-cognitivism was true. In other words, even if non-cognitivism about normative judgements was able to give a coherent account of normative thought and language, and even if it was the right account of moral judgements, there would still be the problem of finding a strong positive motivation for adopting epistemic non-cognitivism.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Sebastian Kletzl
Date:	14:45-15:15, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 105

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Charles Côté-Bouchard (King's College London, United Kingdom)
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Superluminal or Not: A Contemporary Debate Re-analysed

Argun Abrek Canbolat

In this work, I will analyse the debate between Yuri Balashov and Hud Hudson in terms of the views put forward by Tim Maudlin. I believe that the Maudlin view can shed light on the debate and may ensure some new discussions and perspectives. Balashov and Hudson have disputes on whether superluminal motion is possible. Hudson, assuming some metaphysical premises that are not so easy to dispute puts forward an interesting thought experiment and says that superluminal motion is possible. Balashov argues to the contrary, saying that it is impossible. If we are to consider the debate taking into account what Tim Maudlin says in the first chapter of his book "The Metaphysics within Physics", namely, that "laws of nature ought to be accepted as ontologically primitive", we can look at the Balashov-Hudson debate from a new perspective. I believe that Balashov would be a step forward if we take into account the perspective of Maudlin. Thus, in this work, I will review the Balashov-Hudson debate on superluminal motion and posit that if what Maudlin says accounts for something, it supports strictly what Balashov says.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Carlo Maria Cirino
Date:	16:45-17:15, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 105

Argun Abrek Canbolat (Middle East Technical University, Turkey) A. Abrek Canbolat (Ph.D. Student and Rsearch Assistant in phil.). Middle East Technical University. 2006 BA in philosophy. 2009 MA in philosophy. Master thesis about Time in Nietzsche, forthcoming Ph.D. thesis about Philosophy of Time. Publications in Ethics, Metaphysics. E-Mail: abrek@metu.edu.tr

The Epistemic Value of Mastery

Martha Cassidy-Brinn

In my talk I defend a new account of epistemic value. My thesis is that knowledge is valuable insofar as it is as a form of mastery. My position improves upon a popular but flawed account according to which knowledge is valuable because it is an achievement. I demonstrate that my account saves what is plausible in the achievement story while avoiding its downfalls.

I begin by introducing the rival account of knowledge as achievement. I outline its basic structure and the two most dangerous objections to it.

I go on to introduce my improvement upon the achievement account. I define what I mean by mastery, illuminating three key features. I then show that knowledge has all three of these features.

Next I demonstrate that the mastery account is not vulnerable to the two objections. Mastery has all the intuitive appeal of the achievement account, while avoiding both of its fatal defects.

Finally I consider two objections to my account. First I take up the worry that the value I have described is not properly epistemic, but rather a form of practical value and therefore of no interest to epistemologists. I consider three ways of defining epistemic value and argue that on any plausible understanding of the term, my account does concern epistemic value.

Second I address the fear that my account does not avoid the infamous swamping problem, that is, it is unable to explain how knowledge is more valuable than true belief. I show that, on the contrary, from the socially-situated, diachronic position of my account, we recognize that true beliefs are not intrinsically valuable at all. One true unjustified belief, insofar as it exhibits a tendency to act in a way unconducive to mastery, actually has negative value. I strengthen this final argument by explaining away the intuition that true beliefs per se are valuable.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Dejan Makovec
Date:	15:30-16:00, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 105

Martha Cassidy-Brinn (University of Vienna, Austria)
Martha Cassidy-Brinn (MA phil). University of Vienna. 2006 Bachelor of Arts; 2011 Master of Arts; thesis relating intuition, Moorean common sense, and Wittgensteinian certainties. Research interests: epistemology and metaphilosophy.
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Zur Rationalität der Pflicht zum Whistleblowing in der Wissenschaft

Alexander Christian

Unisono fordern forschungsethische Ansätze im Sinne des Responsible Conduct of Research, der Good Scientific Practice und der Scientific Integrity, dass vermeintliches Fehlverhalten von Forschern durch die Mitglieder der Forschergemeinschaft angezeigt wird. Diese Pflicht zum Whistleblowing (Pw) wird in institutionellen Ordnungen, professionellen Ethiken und Empfehlungen zur wissenschaftlichen Qualitätssicherung normalerweise als eine unbedingte Pflicht formuliert und durch den Hinweis ergänzt, dass ihre Nichterfüllung als ein wissenschaftliches Fehlverhalten im Sinne einer Mitwisserschaft anzusehen sei. In konkreten Entscheidungssituationen zeigt sich jedoch, dass Pw nicht bedingungslos erfüllt wird. Dabei werden Virulenz vermeintlichen Fehlverhaltens, angenommene Vergeltungsmaßnahmen gegenüber Whistleblower und Beschuldigten oder Erfolgsaussichten eines Untersuchungsverfahrens gegeneinander abgewogen. Die Problematik wird außerdem durch Fallstudien verschärft, die nahelegen, dass Whistleblower selbst dann mit Vergeltungsmaßnahmen und individuellen Kosten zu rechnen haben, wenn sich ihre Vorwürfe in einem Untersuchungsverfahren erhärten ließen.

In meinem Vortrag werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass die unbedingte Formulierung von Pw von einem simplifizierten Wissenschaftsver-

ständnis zeugt und die Erfüllung von Pw unter bestimmten institu-
tionellen Rahmenbedingungen für die Mitglieder der Forschergemein-
schaft irrational ist. Auf der Grundlage der Empfehlungen von C. K.
Gunsalus und Eleanore G. Shore werde ich dann untersuchen, welche in-
dividuellen und institutionellen Bedingungen erfüllt sein müssen, damit
die Befolgung von Pw rational ist.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	German
Chair:	Florian Boge
Date:	12:15-12:45, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 105

Alexander Christian (Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Ger-
many)
Alexander Christian (M.A.) ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am
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Epistemology of Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD): neurodevelopment of sociality and importance of counterfactuals

Carlo Maria Cirino

utistic spectrum disorders (ASD) are nosological disorders af-
fecting the neuropsychological development, that may arise
during the first years of life. From a clinical perspective,
such disorders are characterized by extremely variable qual-
itative impairments of communication and social interactions, as well

as a limited, stereotyped and repetitive inventory of interests and activities. Recent epidemiological studies indicate that ASDs (autism, Asperger syndrome and pervasive developmental disorders) are relatively frequent; in pediatric age group, they show a higher frequency than cancers, diabetes and AIDS combined together, since they affect approximately 1 baby out of 150. Although these constitute high complexity disorders, for which to this day it has not been possible to define a coherent conceptual model correlating different varieties, there is currently a large agreement, based on abundant scientific evidence, about their biological bases. We can reasonably say, therefore, that the different forms of autism that the clinician evaluates in the diagnosis are, on the one hand, the result of a perspective error ascribable to the neurodevelopment of the individual and, on the other hand, the result of actual different biological contingencies underlying what appears to be, in many cases, the same disorder. Autistic spectrum disorders present, indeed, a multi-faceted etiology, in which many unknown genetic risk factors interact with each other and with a large number of environmental factors. Consequently, the dimensional diagnostic category, actually called ASD, needs to be adapted to the single clinical case through specifiers and associated characteristics that define the boundaries of the disease affecting the patient as a unicum. Given the fact that an epistemological study of autistic spectrum disorders offers several keys to understanding the typical condition of development, particularly through deficits regarding social skills, cognitive flexibility, attention, memory, imitation, etc., we wonder if it is possible to isolate a problematic nucleus for this set of disorders, that is linked to the development of motivation toward social stimuli and precedes it. In this sense, the matter of intersubjectivity, in other words of how children come to perceive others as individuals with intentions as well as the planning and fluency of their actions and narrative structures, requires us to shift our attention to sets of behavioural patterns linked to basic social interactions preceding more complex metacognitive abilities: for example, producing counterfactuals as precursors of the symbolic game (pretend play) and the subsequent moral judgement. Thus, individuals with ASD, who are less able to product counterfactuals and therefore fallible in the most common make-believe games and lacking of adequate emotive and imitative coordination, seem to be stuck in the here and now. For such individuals, what might have been is not more important than what has actually occurred, contrarily to what we are prone to think. The capability of producing counterfactuals

about the past, thus anticipating the moral judgment on themselves (i.e. remorse, second thoughts and regrets), is therefore prevented. However, the question is: what exactly happens when elaborate mental processes compensating a reality that is excessively real come into play in response to such deficits?

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Florian Boge
Date:	10:45-11:15, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 105

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Carlo Maria Cirino (Universite degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo, Italy) Carlo M. Cirino was born in Italy in 1985. After a two-year period of study in architecture at university of Bologna, he moved to Urbino where he obtained his BA degree in Philosophy and Natural Sciences. In the same period he got a two-year Diploma in Eastern Philosophy at the School for Advanced Studies in Eastern and Comparative Philosophy of Rimini. At University of Urbino, he also got his MA degree in Philosophy of Physics and in the same period, he finished the School in Rimini, where he got a Master in Eastern and Comparative Studies. He got also a Master in Philosophical Counseling at University "Regina Apostolorum" in Rome. At the moment he is a PhD student in Science of Complexity at University of Urbino, in the Department of Basic Sciences and Foundations (DiSBeF) and he is conducting an internship at SISSA (International School for Advanced Studies) of Trieste, in the Department of Cognitive and Social Neuroscience. His interests moves from more classic fields like epistemology and philosophy of science to more specific subjects like philosophy of biology and neuroscience to metaphysics. He collaborates with many associations and foundations and has a fair amount of publications.
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Reconsidering Testimonial Knowledge: A Virtuous-Contextualist Account

Michel Croce

This paper concerns the current debate between reductionism and non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. Both the views state a-priori requirements in respect to the epistemic situation of the subject, based on considerations about the sort of reasons which should be necessary and sufficient in each situation to warrant her knowledge. I agree with Lackey's critics of them (see Lackey 2006), but unlike her attempt to combine important features of both views in a dualistic perspective, I aim to demonstrate that this dichotomy is misleading in so far as we demand to attest a criterion of testimonally-based justification apart from considering two relevant factors: contexts and epistemic subjects' character. Indeed, they allow hearer's dynamism in choosing the most apt criterion between different standards of justification for her testimonially based belief.

First of all, following in part Vassallo (2006), I argue that there are at least four details that support a contextualist perspective on testimonial justification: age of speakers, their social relationships, expertise on the matter of conversation and respective aims. Obviously we often deal with situations that involve some of them, but for the sake of argument I will analyze them one-by-one.

The first one refers to all the cases of children's education, where we have to choose to ascribe (or not to ascribe) testimonial knowledge to subjects who could not possess the same epistemic reasons that we would require in cases of testimony between adults.

According to the second, hearers are usually willing to trust a well-known witness, instead of an unknown one and can demand stronger reasons for trusting the former whereas they rely on the latter's testimony every time there are not evident defeaters of it.

The third factor can set an exception to the previous one since, according to it, hearers trust expert witnesses (e.g. doctors, plumbers, lawyers) by virtue of their expertise in respective matters, without demanding them to explicate in detail the reasons for their claims, even if they should be treated like unknown people.

According to the fourth, the relevance of hearer's aim have a hold on

the level of standards of testimonially-based justification that she has to expect from the speaker in order to consider reliable the testimony.

Since this last contextual detail can lead to the second factor of my account, I've to highlight its relevance by means of an example.

Suppose that Anna, Bruce and Chris work in a bank with offices in two buildings at the farthest ends of a square. Anna works in one office, whereas Bruce and Chris work in the other one. Anna is waiting for Chris in order to receive a pass for a concert that will take place the next week and she arranged to meet him at the company canteen. Unfortunately she meets only Bruce who says her: "Chris will be waiting for you at the usual cafe at 6 p.m. Now he is busy" (p). In this ordinary case, neither Anna's aim is crucial nor its expected fulfillment is to be imminent; therefore she can set low standard of testimonially-based justification and trust Bruce's testimony if there are not evident defeaters of her belief.

Consider now a "strong case", where Anna has pressing and more relevant purposes, since she must meet Chris in order to receive a revolver and to kill the unaware Bruce by 7 p.m. The example continues as the previous one but, since the relevance of her aim is high and Bruce could misunderstand the schedule or mistake him for another colleague, Anna could not easily trust Bruce: she needs stronger reasons in order to know that Chris will be waiting for her at 6 p.m. and probably she could decide to do something (e.g. to phone Chris).

The examples show how different epistemic standards lead to different levels of testimonial justification depending on the subject's purposes. My further move is that of explaining what make subjects able to distinguish contexts and to set the respective requirements of justification. I appeal to virtue epistemologists, who claim, following Aristotle (see Zagzebski 1996), that epistemic agents are provided with skills or intellectual virtues that cooperate during the formation of their characters and allow them to achieve knowledge (see Roberts-Jay Wood 2007). This intellectual flourishing occurs in time, requires subjects' growth and marks two kinds of development (not necessarily overlapping): the former is from childhood to adulthood and the latter from incompetence to expertise. In both cases subjects have different levels of skills that lead them to different intellectually skillful performances (see Orozco 2010).

Intellectual virtues allow subjects to achieve knowledge that is avail-

able depending on their intellectual skills or expertise and to recognize which standards of testimonial justification is required by context and subjects' aims. According to the former, whereas children/incompetent subjects can be justified in trusting their caregivers/expert witnesses without demanding particular reasons, adults/expert subjects shall check the reliability of witnesses and testimony-based beliefs before considering these beliefs thoroughgoing knowledge (see Pouivet 2012). According to the latter, whereas the subject has ordinary aims, as in the first case about Anna, she gives more priority to her intellectual courage and confidence in her epistemic background in order to allow her to trust the witness. In the latter instead, it gets that the subject needs more epistemic caution and firmness in order to warrant the succeeding of the date.

I conclude that this account allow us to put aside many questions which arise from the traditional views about testimony and to explain more efficiently how subjects can achieve testimonial knowledge.

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Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Martha Cassidy-Brinn
Date:	12:15-12:45, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 105

Michel Croce (University of Genoa, Italy)
Michel Croce was born in 1988. After the classical high school diploma (100/100 cum laude) in 2007, he had the BA degree in Philosophy at the University of Genoa in 2010 with a BA thesis on the analytic philosophy of religion. His MA thesis, in 2012, concerned the certainty in the Cartesian and Wittgensteinian tradition. In 2013 he started his PhD project in Philosophy at the University of Genoa and he is working on epistemology of testimony and virtue epistemology under the supervision of Prof. Angelo Campodonico. He gave talks in Genoa, Macerata, Stockholm and wrote a paper for the "Acts of Communication of Certainty and Uncertainty Conference" (forthcoming, Blackwell Publishing). He is also member of the Philosophical News' Editorial Board.
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The Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Deductive Reasoning as Cultural Phenomena

Catarina Dutilh-Novaes

This talk will present a dialogical account of deductive reasoning (narrowly construed, as involving necessary truth-preservation), focusing both on its ontogeny – the onset of deductive reasoning in an individual reasoner – and its phylogeny – the historical emergence of the concept of deduction in Ancient Greece. In a slogan, the main claim of the paper is: when it comes to deduction, we may say that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. In both cases, we seem to be dealing with cultural, social phenomena; in particular, deductive reasoning skills must be trained for to be mastered (typically, in the context of formal schooling), as they do not arise spontaneously in untrained reasoners. But I will also argue that some "mundane" forms of dialogical interaction such as story-telling and adversarial betting may also cue untrained reasoners to perform closer to the deductive canons. This is so precisely in virtue of the inherent ialogical nature of deductive reasoning.

Section:	Plenary Talk
Language:	English
Chair:	Albert J.J. Anglberger
Date:	14:00-15:30, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

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Catarina Dutilh-Novaes (University of Groningen, The Netherlands)
Catarina Dutilh-Novaes is an Assistant Professor and Rosalind Franklin Fellow at the Department of Theoretical Philosophy of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Groningen. She is also an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy and an editor for the Review of Symbolic Logic. Her main fields of research are history and philosophy of logic. She also have general interests in medieval philosophy, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, philosophy of mathematics, general philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and empirically-informed approaches to philosophy in general. Currently (2011-2016) she is also leading the research project "The Roots of Deduction". Recent publications: "Formal Languages in Logic - A Philosophical and Cognitive Analysis", Cambridge, 2012 and "Mathematical reasoning and external symbolic systems", Logique & Analyse, 2013.
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Is Pain Humiliating? - On the Relation between Dignity and Pain

Julia Apollonia Engels

This paper seeks to explore the relation between pain and dignity. It uses Elaine Scarry's description of the self-alienating and destructive effects that severe (acute and chronic) pain experiences have as a starting point for the claim that pain experiences indeed seem to be humiliating. Following the approach of Avishai Margalit, they can furthermore be described as violations of a

person's dignity, since to Margalit,a person's dignity is violated, when she is humiliated, which is the case, when she is treated in a way that it becomes impossible for her to maintain her chosen self-concept and self-respect. However, not all pain experiences seem to have these devastating impacts; which leads the author to two claims: (1) It is not the pain itself that is humiliating and hence a threat to a person's dignity. (2) It is rather the setting in and the circumstances under which a pain is experienced that gives it a humiliating quality. In order to present a convincing justification for claim (2), Margalit's concept of dignity is then extended by an emphasis on the social dimension of dignity. The author claims that it is the persons, who interact with a human being in pain, who can make this experience a humiliating one or can actually prevent this, depending on how they choose to react upon and with the person in pain. If involved people manage to react properly, pain has not necessarily a destructive effect, but can rather be integrated into the person's own self-concept and hence does not mean a threat to her dignity. The paper then concludes by describing ways of a behavior that helps to protect or restore the dignity of persons who are experiencing severe situations of pain.

Section:	Ethics & Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Hendrik Kempt
Date:	11:30-12:00, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

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Julia Apollonia Engels (University of Bielefeld, Paderborn)
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Automatic Metaphor Interpretation Applied to the Argumentation of New Atheists

Christian J. Feldbacher & Laurenz Hudetz

"eligion is the opium of the people." and "Religious beliefs are viruses of the mind."—these are popular metaphors used by Atheists (Karl Marx, Richard Dawkins etc.) in order to argue against religious belief and theological claims. Metaphors often play an important role in arguments, particularly in those of New Atheists (e.g. Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens). For New Atheists use metaphors such as the above mentioned not only to attack theological claims, but also to explain why religion is so wide spread and firmly established in society as well as significantly involved in cultural processes.

Given that metaphors can be important parts of arguments and that the common methods for evaluating literal claims and arguments are not (directly) applicable to metaphorical ones, several questions arise: In which way are metaphors important? How do metaphorical premises of an argument support its conclusion? What is an adequate evaluation procedure for metaphorical claims and arguments? In our talk we will give answers especially to the first and second question and indicate how an answer to the third question might look like. Metaphors in arguments, so our analysis, introduce some very general assumptions about the domain of investigation and these general assumptions— spelled out explicitly—are in support of the conclusion of the argument. To render our analysis more precisely we will outline an implementation of automatic metaphor recognition and interpretation with the help of structural semantics and the linguistic database WordNet (Princeton University). By applying this implementation it will be possible to evaluate metaphorical arguments by common (logical or probabilistic) methods as used in the case of literal arguments.

Section:	Philosophy of Religion
Language:	German
Chair:	Alexander Gebharter
Date:	16:45-17:15, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 107

Christian J. Feldbacher (University of Innsbruck & University of Düsseldorf) & **Laurenz Hudetz** (University of Salzburg, Austria)
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Externalism, Enactive Approach and Canonic Neurons

Gabriele Ferretti

will focus on the relation among the Enactive Thesis, Externalism and the recent discovery of Canonic and Bimodal neural systems. According to Enactive Thesis our knowledge, emerging from cognitive structures based on recurring sensory patterns, is physiologically connected with our capacity to conduct actions thanks to perception and vice versa. The sensory-motor system is fundamental to embodied-cognition experiencing the external world. The coupling between the bodily cognitive processes and the environment is basic. Enactivism inherited some (proto externalist) intuitions by James J. Gibson and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, suggesting that the mind depends on world/agents interactions. According to environmental theory by Gibson, animal behavior is based on a single movement/perception system. The concept of affordance, the environmental function that an object offers to an individual, or the sum of its practical uses, is primary. Also O'Regan and Noe claim that the mind is constituted by the sensory-motor interaction between the agent and the world. The set of actions results from the matching between environment and body.

Furthermore, the Extended Mind model (Clark, Chalmers, 1998) suggests that cognition is larger than subject's body, and that its boundaries aren't always inside the skin. The mind uses objects in the external environment as extensions of itself. Andy Clark states that cognition leaks out into body and world.

A related doctrine is Externalism, according to which in order to have certain types of intentional mental states, it is necessary to be correctly related to the environment. Externalist (e.g., Putnam) have claimed that meanings and thoughts aren't in the mind, and quite

similarly Noe states that perception isn't a process in the brain, but the skilful activity of the animal as a whole. Some externalists affirm that phenomenal content are partially external to the body of the subject.

In "Proof of an external world" (1939) G.E. Moore gave a common sense argument against scepticism by raising his right hand and saying "Here is one hand", and then raising his left and saying "And here is another", then concluding that there are at least two external objects in the world, and therefore that he knew (by this argument) that an external world exists. It is not by chance that I will focus on hands, precisely, on touch sense and affordances in their enactive dimension. Recently neuroscience brain imaging experiments using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have discovered the canonic-neurons system, which give us a better founded idea of the relations between our perception/action system and the cognitive processes behind our knowledge of the external world. The working hypothesis of the present paper is to show: a) that the discovery of canonic neurons supports the thesis of cognition as strictly based on enactive processes; b) that the discovery of bimodal neurons supports the Extendend Mind model; c) that according to results obtained in point a) and point b), we can argue, against anti-realistic representationalism and sense-data theory, that it is possible to know the external world.

In the first section I show how the discovery of canonic and bimodal neurons strengthens the Enactive Thesis and the Gibson's intuition about the concept of affordance: neurophysiological studies, confirm that motion and perception cannot be divided in their cortical aspects (at least in regions involving canonic phenomenona). I illustrate experiments (Rizzolatti, Gentilucci 1988) showing that at brain level there is a strong correlation between the way of grasping and the codification of the object. Cognition is attuned with the pragmatic use that external objects "mean" for the acting subject. In the brain dimension visualizing an object means understanding what we can really do with that object, how can we precisely catch it, or what kind of object we are in front of, we have to be aware of, or we can interact with. Seeing means realizing the way we can grasp, for example, the object. We cognitively catch it in a way defined by Dretske as non-epistemic (Dretske, 1979). It is not a chance that both actions, catching the object and seeing it, activate the same cortical regions (many of which in motor cortex).

Then, I'll talk about bimodal neurons. They are similar to pure somatosensory neurons, that fire only to somatic stimuli. Moreover, bi-

modal neurons are more complex. They fire also thanks to visual stimuli, but only when the visual stimulus comes near their tactile receptive field (Fogassi et al., 1992), a particular space determined by their visual receptive field as an extension of somatosensory receptive field regardless the direction of the glance (Gentilucci et al., 1988) or stimulus across the retina (Gentilucci et al., 1983; Fogassi et al., 1996).We can define the surrounding space thanks to our organ in relation with the external objects. Thanks to this relation there are different bodily reference systems, because there are different body parts. Cognitive structures emerge from sensory recurring patterns, allowing to guide actions thanks to perception.

In the second section I argue that some experiments by Atsushi and Iriki on bimodal neurons (Iriki et al., 1996) support the Extended Mind model, showing that if we use a tool to catch an object, visual receptive field includes the tool, that becomes at brain level, a body part, changing the extrapersonal space in peripersonal space.

In the third section I use these results to criticize anti-realist representationalism and sense-data theory, holding that what is given in our experience is not non-physical entities (sense-data): these experiments show that we don't build arbitrary images, but isomorphic mappings of the external objects.

Finally, I analyze neuroscientific data, in relation with the Enactive Thesis, Externalism and Extended Mind in order to explore the possibility of Direct Realism, according to whom, when one perceives the world, the mind-indipendent object of perception are constituents of one's experience. In other words, we can directly perceive the external world as it really is.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Sebastian Kletzl
Date:	15:30-16:00, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 105

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The Logic of Dispositions

Florian Fischer

Dispositionszuschreibungen haben eine einfache Oberflächenform: "$D(x)$". Die enge Verbindung, die Dispositionen zu Konditionalsätzen haben, zeigt sich schon an der kanonischen Form in der Dispositionen angegeben werden können: Stimulus und Manifestation werden explizit genannt. Eine einfache Äquivalenzbeziehung "$\forall x(D(x) \leftrightarrow (S(x) \rightarrow M(x)))$" führt jedoch schnell zu Problemen. Nimmt man die entsprechende Beziehung dafür, dass eine Disposition nicht vorliegt hinzu "$\forall x(\neg D(x) \leftrightarrow (S(x) \rightarrow \neg M(x)))$", lässt sich leicht ein Widerspruch, die sog. "Carnap Paradoxie", ableiten. Wenn die Stimulusbedingung "M" nicht erfüllt ist, folgt - ex falso quodlibet - die Wahrheit von "$D(x)$" und "$\neg D(x)$". Auch Carnap'schen Reduktionssätzen "$\forall x(S(x) \rightarrow (D(x) \leftrightarrow M(x)))$" droht ein ähnlicher Widerspruch.

Es gibt verschiedene Ideen mit diesem Problem umzugehen. Solange das entsprechende Objekt (oder ein anderes derselben Art) noch nicht in der relevanten Testbedingung war, spricht man ihm keinen Wahrheitswert zu. Daneben gibt es Versuche ein stärkeres Konditional wie die materiale Implikation zu verwenden, vornehmlich ein kontrafaktisches Konditional oder zu einer Relevanz-Logik überzugehen. Ich werde diese drei Lösungsstrategien vorstellen und kritisch bewerten, wie gut sie als Wahrmacher für Dispositionszuschreibungen funktionieren. Alternativ könnten Dispositionszuschreibungen direkt von ontischen Eigenschaften (entweder kategorealen, dispositionalen oder neutralen) wahrgemacht werden.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Laurenz Hudetz
Date:	10:30-11:00, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 101

Florian Fischer (Uni Bonn, Uni Köln, Germany)
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"The logic Year" am ILLC Amsterdam; Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 2010 Magister in Philosophie, Germanistik und Astronomie mit einer Arbeit über Persistenz in der Speziellen Relativitätstheorie. Veröffentlichungen in diesem Bereich.
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Can Logic be Conceived of as a Competence Theory for Thought?

Leonard Geerdink

It has proven difficult to conceive the relationship between logic and thought. Although there seems to be consensus among philosophers, logicians and psychologist that logic is normative for thought, it is unclear what this belief amounts to. One way to make this idea more precise is by claiming that logic is about how an ideal reasoner would reason under ideal circumstances. Logic is then conceived of as a competence theory for thought. The most famous and best worked out defense of this idea was given by John Macnamara in his A Border Dispute (1986), although the view is widely held, especially within the branch of psychology which studies human reasoning. Two driving question within this branch of psychology have been how human performance differs from competence and why (see for a recent overview (Holyoak & Morrison, 2012) and (Manktelow, 2012)).

But conceiving logic as a competence theory of thought opens the door to the charge of psychologism. That is, it claims that logic is about thought. This view, however, has been generally rejected by modern logicians, who follow Frege in his famous critique of psychologistic conceptions of logic. According to Frege, logic is not about thought but about truth (See (Frege, 1893) and (1918)). In this presentation I will critically reexamine the view that logic should be conceived of as the competence theory of thought and give special attention to the charge of psychologism in light of recent developments in psychology and philosophical logic, most notably the descriptive logical pluralism

of Stenning & Van Lambalgen (2008) and the normative pluralism of Beall & Restall (2007).

Leonard M. Geerdink (University of Groningen, The Netherlands) Leon M. Geerdink (MA) studied philosophy at Utrecht University focusing on the history of analytic philosophy and the history of logic broadly conceived. Both his BA thesis (2010) and MA thesis (2012) focused on the early logical work of Bertrand Russell seen in its historical context. He is currently a PhD student at the University of Groningen in Catarina Dutilh-Novaes' project The Roots of Deduction where he works on an empirically and historically informed conception of the role of logic in the psychology of reasoning.
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A New Account of Aristotelian Endurantism

Luca Gili

Does Aristotelian endurantism lead to a deterministic account of change processes? (A) I show that in his Metaphysics Aristotle endorsed the so-called "principle of plenitude", and that he nevertheless understood contingency propositions of the form

(*) "A is contingently B"

as true propositions, even if there is no instant in time in which B actually holds of A.

By making this claim I challenge the recent reading of Beere 2009. I suggest that there is a distinction between Aristotle's "metaphysical" treatment of the concepts of potentiality and of actuality, and its "logical" counterpart. From a metaphysical viewpoint, a proposition like (*) is true iff there at least one instant in time in which B holds of A.

However, if we make abstraction from this account, and we consider possibility in itself, we can conceive of it otherwise: there are indeed events which happen by chance, and which can never be the case, altough they are said to be possible (cf. on this Prior Analytics A, 13,32 b10ff.). In other words, our "logical account" of possibility makes room to unrealized possibilities; change should be understood accordingly.

(B) Brower (2010) has proposed a version of Aristotelian endurantism, which aims at avoiding the difficulties encountered by the theory of temporal intrinsics in order to expound change. However, Brower suggests that the underlying nature of change is matter, but he does not take into account the fact that matter has always a certain quantity, and quantity may change as well. As a consqeuence, his theory seems in need for revision.

On the basis of the above historical reconstruction, I shall state that change must bu understood as the passage from potentiality to actuality. These notions correspond to the notions of matter and properties of matter, in our metaphysical analysis of reality. Matter, however, should not be understood as the mere substratum, of which we only know that it has a certain quantity. On the contrary, it is a relational notion, and may be replaced with "underlying nature" of change.

I propose a new version of Aristotelian endurantism, which aims at avoiding some of the difficulties of Brower's proposal.

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Beere 2009 = J. Beere, Doing and Being, Oxford: OUP, 2009
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Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Florian Fischer
Date:	12:15-12:45, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

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Luca Gili (University of Leuven (K.U. Leuven), Belgium)
Luca Gili (1987) received his BA and his MA in Philosophy from the University of Pisa (Italy), and his BA in Arts and humanities from the Scuola Normale Superiore (Pisa, Italy). He is a PhD student at the Institute of Philosophy of the K.U.Leuven and a fellow of the Flemish Research Fund. He has published several papers in the field of ancient logic in journals like the Classical Quarterly, Mnemosyne, Documenti e studi, the Rheinisches Museum fuer Philologie.
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Transtemporal Reference for Presentism

Johannes Grössl

Presentism is the thesis that only presently existing things exist at all (Crisp 2005). It is contrasted by 4Dimensionalism, postulating that there exist some x, such that x is not present (Rea 2005). Varieties of 4Dimensionalism include the Growing Block Theory (Tooley 1997), according to which only the past and the present exist, Branching Futurism (McCall 1994), according to which all possible futures exist, however in a somewhat different mode of existence, and Eternalism, according to which past, present, and future exist in an ontologically equivalent way.

The price of presentism is not negligible. It is impossible to refer to past or future objects or state of affairs, if reference requires the existence of the referred entity. Alvin Plantinga called the thesis that singular propositions can only exist if the individuals which they are about exist Existentialism (Plantinga 1983). If Existentialism and Presentism are both true, there can actually be no singular propositions about the past or the future, which is a very problematic conclusion,

since we constantly refer to past objects and states of affairs in our daily life. Even worse, causation as an important trans-temporal relation cannot be accounted for in a standard presentist ontology.

In order to present a possible solution for this problem, I will present a theory, based on the account of quasitruths by Ted Sider (1999), which accounts for transtemporal reference within presentism. Such reference will be analyzed as quasireference which is shown to be reducible to causation as a relation between two successive world states - the only genuine transtemporal relation which needs to be permitted in presentism. Opposite to Aristotle (De Interpretatione), Lukasiewicz (1930), Lucas (1973; 1989), and others, I do not give up bivalence by holding that propositions about the contingent future either do not have a truth value or have a truth value different from true or false. I also do not postulate that they are all false (Rhoda, Boyd and Belt 2006). I argue that bivalence for genuine propositions can be maintained, while statements about the contingent future are not considered genuine propositions, which is why they neither have a truth value nor ever will acquire a truth value. Rather, I postulate that such sentences express m-propositions, which only have a truth value in respect to a certain eternalist model of reality, which as an abstract entity can be permitted in a Presentist ontology.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Luca Gili
Date:	15:30-16:00, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Johannes Grössl (University of Innsbruck, Austria)
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Welche Rollen spielen moralische Prinzipien?

Tobias Gutmann

In der aktuellen Debatte um die Rolle moralischer Prinzipien berufen sich Partikularisten vor allem auf ein Phänomen: den sogenannten Holismus in der Theorie der Gründe. Diesem zufolge kann eine moralisch relevante Eigenschaft, die in einem Fall zugunsten der Ausführung einer Handlung spricht in anderen Fällen moralisch neutral sein oder gar gegen die Ausführung einer Handlung sprechen. Diese Tatsache, so behaupten einige Partikularisten, verhindere die Möglichkeit, moralische Prinzipien zu formulieren.

Meines Erachtens hält dieses Argument nicht, was es verspricht; erstens, weil das genannte Phänomen des Valenzwechsels selbst umstritten ist, und zweitens, weil sich, selbst wenn es derartige Valenzwechsel gibt, moralische Prinzipien formulieren lassen. In meinem Vortrag will ich dafür plädieren in der aktuellen Diskussion stattdessen die folgenden, keineswegs neuen Überlegungen stärker zu berücksichtigen: Moralische Prinzipien können nicht der Endpunkt jeglicher Begründung konkreter moralischer Urteile sein, weil sie selbst unter Rekurs auf konkrete moralische Urteile gerechtfertigt werden müssen - zumindest dann, wenn es keine wahren analytischen Prinzipien gibt und sich keine normativen aus rein deskriptiven Aussagen ableiten lassen. Eine ähnliche Abhängigkeit besteht im Hinblick auf die praktische Rolle moralischer Prinzipien: lassen sich aus moralischen Prinzipien Handlungsanweisungen ableiten, die unseren moralischen Ansichten zu sehr widersprechen, dann sind wir dazu geneigt, das moralische Prinzip zu verwerfen bzw. anzupassen. Auch hier stellen demnach unsere Ansichten über einige konkrete Handlungen einen Rahmen dar, an dem sich Prinzipien messen lassen müssen. Statt dem Holismus der Gründe sollte demnach die holistische Natur unserer Überzeugungen im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion um die Rollen moralischer Prinzipien stehen.

Section:	Ethics & Political Philosophy
Language:	German
Chair:	Julia Apollonia Engels
Date:	14:00-14:30, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

Tobias Gutmann (Universität Duisburg-Essen, Germany)

Tobias Gutmann (M.A.). Universität Duisburg-Essen. 2010 Magister in Philosophie mit einer Arbeit über die Rolle moralischer Prinzipien. Seit 2012 Arbeit an einer Dissertation zum gleichen Thema. Eine Publikation zum Thema moralische Uneinigkeit.

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Yablo, Modal Scepticism and the "Dialectics" of Conceivability

Péter Hartl

How can we know that something is possible? Stephen Yablo defended a sophisticated conceivability-based account about modal knowledge. Since Yablo's intention was to explicate how can we have knowledge about "p is possible"-claims, different sceptical arguments might jeopardise his project. I investigate how could one reply to some general and specific sceptical arguments concerning modal knowledge assuming Yablo's theory as a working hypothesis. I present the main sceptical argument against conceivability arguments in philosophy raised by Van Inwagen. I examine whether the sceptical conclusion is supported by Yablo's position. I will argue that Van Inwagen misrepresents Yablo's theory and his sceptical conclusion derives from that he neglects the "non-ideal", fallibilist feature of Yablo's account.

I offer some additional sceptical arguments, namely, the problem of subjectivist justification, the problem of disagreement, and the scepticism about essentialist principles. The first objection says that Yablo's theory of modal knowledge cannot guarantee inter-subjective justifi-

cation of possibility claims. Thus, his theory has an unhappy consequence, namely, what is possible is relative to subject. According to the second objection, there is an unsolvable disagreement concerning metaphysical possibility statements, and Yablo cannot explain how can we solve these disagreements. The third sceptical argument intends to show that we cannot have knowledge about essentialist principles, thus we cannot know, for instance, whether Socrates could have been a frog or not.

I investigate how these sceptical worries could be responded. I argue that Yablo's account doesn't lead to either global or local scepticism about conceivability based arguments in philosophy. However, it doesn't mean that either all conceivability arguments or essentialist principles are free from doubt. Built on Yablo's considerations of modal error I sketch a theory about the dialectics of conceivability arguments which might show that we can have at least moderate knowledge of possibility by means of conceivability.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Martha Cassidy-Brinn
Date:	09:45-10:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 105

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Proof Theoretic Harmony With Higher-Order Rules

Ole T. Hjortland

ogical inferentialism is the idea that the meaning of a logical connective is determined by the inference rules that govern its use. Proof theoretic semantics attempts to make this idea precise in a proof theoretic framework, using for example natural deduction or sequent calculus rules. Since Prior's infamous connective tonk much of proof theoretic semantics have been occupied with formal (anti-tonk) conditions which rule out ill-behaved connectives (e.g. conservativeness, harmony). Common between them is that inference rules only succeed in determining the meaning of a connective only if the proof theoretic conditions are fulfilled. On the traditional account, however, such conditions are insensitive to substructural dimensions of proof theory, e.g. the distinction between additive and multiplicative connectives. We argue that proof theoretic semantics ought to have the resources to attribute different meanings to substructurally distinct connectives. Subsequently we show how to develop a notion of proof theoretic harmony that preserves substructural distinctions from introduction to elimination rules.

Section:	Plenary Talk
Language:	English
Chair:	Albert J.J. Anglberger
Date:	09:00-10:30, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Ole T. Hjortland (MCMP, LMU Munich, Germany)
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The Metric of Equality and Utility

Viktor Ivankovic

I n an influential paper dating back over a decade ago, Derek Parfit forced egalitarians, those who concern themselves with the justice of distributional schemes and the equal welfare of individuals, to retreat back to much more limited philosophical conceptions. According to Parfit, those egalitarians who believe that inequality is in itself at least in one way bad must adhere to very dubious philosophical conclusions, such as to agree it is in some way good to lower the welfare of one, more advantaged group, to the previously established level of a worse off group, solely for the purpose of achieving equality. This is the essence of the leveling down objection.

The presentation deals with two egalitarian responses to the leveling down objection, both of which I argue to be unsatisfactory. I offer a third route that allows for certain cases of leveling down, by claiming that the values of equality and utility should be brought into a common metric.

The first response, offered by pluralist egalitarians, denies the objection's actual potency. These theorists claim egalitarianism is committed to more than just one value (mainly, equality and utility). Such reasoning would sometimes allow for leveling down, since just like equality is not the only thing that matters, neither is utility. Simultaneously, this view would allow certain situations to be good in one sense (when one of the values is concerned), while being bad in another.

The other egalitarian response to the leveling down objection is to arrange the principles of utility and equality in a lexical manner. In such frameworks, equality is downgraded to a principle of lesser priority than the principle of utility in considerations of distribution.

I will argue, in this presentation, that both of these views are inadequate, and that we should opt for a third route. The course that I advocate will prompt three main claims: 1.) that equality should not be viewed independently of utility; 2.) that a state of greater equality may be preferred to a state of greater utility in a limited array of cases, and; 3.) that finding a solution to the problem suffers from a lack of a proper metric for the purposes of measuring between the values of equality and utility, or bringing them into commensuration, in egalitarian considerations of distributive justice.

Section:	Ethics & Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Hendrik Kempt
Date:	12:15-12:45, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

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The Hard Problem of Consciousness

Kinga Jeczminska

Chalmers (1995) claims that the hard problem of consciousness cannot be solved by contemporary neuroscience since it does not explain why performance of certain functions give rise to experience. Chalmers rejects Crick and Koch's suggestion of 35-75 Hz neural oscillations in the cerebral cortex, Baars's global workspace theory, Dennett's multiple drafts model, Edelman's neural Darwinism model and Jackendoff's intermediate level theory, claiming that they leave the bridging question unanswered (Chalmers 1995).

However, the very reason for posing the hard problem of consciousness is questionable. It seems that the hard problem might be extended to other disciplines of science, leading to questions why particular mechanisms or structures give rise to certain things and not others, e.g. why water - and not gasoline - has the chemical structure of H_2O (Block 2006). This argumentation makes the hard problem illusory, so there

were proposals to reformulate the problem into a question how something objective can be subjective or how something first-personal can be third-personal (Block 2006). I argue that such reformulation may still not save the hard problem from becoming trivial or being similar to other problems that could be posed in scientific disciplines not connected with consciousness.

Furthermore, I will argue that arguments against physicalism seem to presuppose the explanatory gap instead of proving it. Thought-experiments such as the knowledge argument presuppose that structures and functions of mental states are not enough to explain the phenomenal consciousness, which is true only when the hard problem holds, so these thought-experiments cannot be used in the argumentation in favour of the hard problem (Carruthers & Schier 2012). Thus the hard problem seems either illusionary or not well argued for.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Tae-Kyung Kim
Date:	09:45-10:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 107

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Reichenbach und das konstitutive apriori

Andreas Joecks

Am Anfang der 1920er Jahre modifizierte Hans Reichenbach im Zuge der Popularisierung der Allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie (ART) den kantischen Begriff des apriori. Diese Begriffsmodifizierung möchte ich im Vortrag herausstellen und durch ihre Geschichte andeuten, dass diese Idee immer noch leistungsstark ist, was man u.a. an Michael Friedmans Projekt in "Dynamics of Reason" sehen kann.

Zu diesem Zweck werde ich zunächst in aller Kürze Kants Begriff des apriori einführen, so wie der Begriff in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft und in den Prolegomena präsentiert wurde. Kant sah das apriori als (i) allgemein und als (ii) notwendig an. Den Fokus lege ich in meiner Darstellung auf die Formen der Sinnlichkeit, insbesondere auf der Konzeption des Raumes. Nachdem ich vorgestellt habe, dass Kant den Raum als genuin euklidisch versteht, werde ich grob erläutern was man unter euklidischer Geometrie versteht. Nach einem kurzen Ausflug in die Entwicklung der nicht-euklidischen Geometrien, komme ich zur ART und diskutiere deren Verbindung zur Geometrie. Da die ART in erster Linie eine Theorie über physikalische Größen ist, verwundert es zunächst, dass geometrische Überlegungen hier eine Rolle spielen. Im Rahmen dieser Ausführungen komme ich wieder zum kantischen Begriff zurück. Durch die Annahme der ART war der kantische Begriff des apriori für die wissenschaftliche Philosophie unhaltbar geworden. Hier nun setzt die Reichenbach'sche Modifikation ein, die darin besteht, dass die Bedingung (ii) aufgegeben wird. So wird versucht, den klassischen apriori Begriff mit der ART kompatibel zu machen. Diesen modifizierten Begriff nennt Reichenbach konstitutives apriori. Dieser Begriff lässt eine Formulierung des apriori zu, die einerseits erlaubt, dass es apriori Erkenntnisse, die unabhängig von jeder Erfahrung zu rechtfertigen sind, gibt, die aber andererseits durch die Tatsache, dass sie die Bedingungen der Erfahrung als veränderlich ansieht, den Einsichten der ART u.ä. gerecht werden kann.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	German
Chair:	Sebastian Kletzl
Date:	14:00-14:30, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 105

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An Exemplar of a Postional Approach to Temporal Logic

Anna Maria Karczewska

.A. Kripke in his letter (1958) to A.N. Prior argued that the standard temporal logic (i.e. the Prior's temporal logic) does not conform to the contemporary physics, especially, to the Einstein's Theory of Relativity. It is so because the Theory of Relativity precludes the existence of the objective present-time which in fact constitutes one of the fundamental concepts of the Prior's logic. Prior attempted to respond to the Kripke's objection in several manners, inter alia by constructing branching-time logics. However, branching-time logics did not succeed in satisfying the requirements of the contemporary physics.

M. Tkaczyk's thesis is that the modal-logic type of approach to temporal logic cannot be merely adjusted to the area of physical discourse since it is strongly influenced by some tense-logic principles. Tkaczyk advocates the positional approach to temporal logic. His temporal logic employs the concept of simultaneity rather than the concept of

the present-time since in place of temporal assertion constants (as "It has at some time been the case that" or "It has always been the case that") it contains the realization operator that is a kind of temporal conjunction.

In my talk I will present Tkaczyk's positional logic ET and analyze its application in the area of physical discourse. I intend also to submit a supplementation to the Tkaczyk's proposition by introducing the definitions of the counterparts of the G. H. von Wright's logics' connectives ("and then", "and next") that establish the ordering of the moments of time.

Section:	Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Christine Schurz
Date:	10:30-11:00, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 104

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Moralische Kompromisse

Hendrik Kempt

N ormative Theorien der Moral wie der Utilitarismus, der Kontraktualismus oder deontologische Ansätze formulieren in der Regel widerspruchfreie Theorien über das, was zu tun das richtige oder gute, bzw. falsche oder schlechte sei. Allerdings zeigen unsere Erfahrungen, dass wir oft trotz offenbar fehlerfreien

Argumentationen mit stabilen Uneinigkeiten über moralische Entscheidungen zu tun haben.

Eine Bewältigung dieser Uneinigkeiten könnte in Form eines Kompromisses erfolgen. Dieser scheint jedoch zu beinhalten, dass man von seiner eigenen Meinung abrückt, obwohl man von dieser vorher überzeugt war. Der Vortrag soll zuerst die begrifflichen Voraussetzungen erörtern, wie ein Kompromiss über moralische Überzeugungen zu verstehen ist, um anschließend der Frage nachzugehen, wann und unter welchem Umständen es moralisch gerechtfertigt ist, zum Zwecke eines Kompromisses resp. dessen Ergebnis seine eigene, ursprüngliche Überzeugung nicht durchzubringen. Problematisiert werden soll diese Frage vor allem aufgrund der Zufälligkeit der Uneingkeit verschiedener Diskussionsteilnehmer. Anhand eines Gedankenexperiments wird gezeigt, dass Kompromisse zwar durchaus ihre Berechtigung haben, jedoch stets ein starker Zweifel über die Rechtfertigkeit zurückbleibt.

Section:	Ethics & Political Philosophy
Language:	German
Chair:	Julia Apollonia Engels
Date:	14:45-15:15, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

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Colours, Animals and Contents - Is there Non-Conceptual Content?

Tae-Kyung Kim

According to some studies, creatures like honeybees or human infants, whom are considered to be without concept, can perceive colour constancy. If these studies are correct, they can provide appropriate reasons for believing non-conceptualism and suggest that it may be possible for us to have a content of colour experience without a conceptual content.

Against this, I raise two issues. First, we cannot share an animal's inner experience; what we can get from animal's behaviour is only the appearance of causality between animals' reactions and objects. Second, the explanation for a certain type of data processing/reaction of stimuli cannot be the same as an explanation of the content of experience.

Regarding causality, I briefly examine the normativity of concepts in order to distinguish "reaction to stimuli with concepts" from mere reactions. If animals' reactions to stimuli lack normativity, then what we learn is only that there is causality between them. If so, it is hard to know whether animals have contents of stimuli in their experience simply through the appearance of such a causal relationship.

Finally, I will conclude that we need to take care with this, because such non-conceptual approaches can lead us to believe that the content of experience is sometimes mysterious.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Sebastian Müller
Date:	15:30-16:00, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 107

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Testimony and Instruments

Sebastian Kletzl

I n this talk I want to emphasize a similarity between testimony and instruments as sources of knowledge. The claim of my talk is that both are what can be called "social sources of knowledge".

I argue for this claim in four steps. In the first step I have to define what makes a source of knowledge social. I will argue that this is because other agents have a direct influence on my coming to knowledge. This is opposed to what I call "on-board sources of knowledge" like, for example, perception. Here no other agents play a role in my coming to knowledge.

In the second step I will show why testimony is a social source of knowledge in this sense. This is because the reliability of another agent - the speaker - is a necessary condition of the hearer to arrive at knowledge. Those two points can be taken as common ground on which almost everybody in the debates about testimony agrees. I will therefore concentrate on the two steps which follow.

In the third step I want argue that the outcomes reached so far are best cashed out via two ideas. First, the relevance of the norm of assertion for the testimonial belief-forming process. Rational agents are normally subject to epistemic norms in the belief-forming process. An example is what can be called the "no-defeater norm". The subject who forms the belief shall not hold a belief true for which she has an undefeated defeater. Testimony is a source of knowledge where an epistemic norm - the norm of assertion - is also targeting agents other than the investigating subject herself. Second, Sanford Goldberg's concepts of "epistemic buck-passing" and "blame" show in my opinion how this norm is epistemically relevant. Goldberg argues that in testimonial knowledge the hearer can pass the epistemic buck back to the speaker concerning her justification for the proposition she acquires via testimony. The blame phenomenon describes how she can hold a speaker accountable is she hasn't lived up to her epistemic duties.

In a fourth step I want to argue that those two points also apply to cases where a user acquires knowledge with the aid of an instrument. The user can pass the buck for the reliability of the instrument to its manufacturers and calibrators. If those agents haven't lived up to their

epistemic duties, this failure can be blamed via an epistemic norm, which I call the "norm if calibration".

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Martha Cassidy-Brinn
Date:	11:45-12:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 105

Sebastian Kletzl (University of Vienna, Vienna)
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Stability à la Douven & Meijs

Jakob Koscholke

ecently, Hannes Leitgeb has elaborated the idea of bridging the gap between qualitative and quantitative theories of belief. According to the first class of theories, believing that some proposition is true is a yes-no matter - an epistemic subject can either believe or disbelieve that it will rain tomorrow. According to the second class of theories, belief is a matter of degrees - an epistemic subject's belief that it will rain tomorrow can be more or less strong. By introducing a novel concept - the notion of a proposition's stability - Leitgeb has been able to define qualitative belief in terms of quantitative belief and thereby to weaken the tension between the two classes of theories of belief.

In my talk I present a generalization of Leitgeb's notion of stability, extending its applicability from single propositions to finite sets of propositions. Interestingly enough, this generalization establishes a conceptual connection to Igor Douven's and Wouter Meijs' work on

coherence. It also sheds new light on Carnap's rather neglected notion of firmness. Using all these insights, I present a measure that can be understood as quantifying the mutual stability of a set of propositions. I show that this measure masters a certain class of test cases in which nearly all coherence measures proposed so far fail.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Dejan Makovec
Date: 14:00-14:30, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location: HS 105

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Wie ist Autonomie am Lebensende möglich?

Dorothea Kotalik

Die Autonomie des Patienten ist im Bereich der Medizin eine noch junge Errungenschaft, die das Verhältnis zwischen Ärzten und Patienten verändert hat. Alle medizinisch angezeigten Behandlungen bedürfen nach einer vorausgehenden Aufklärung durch einen Arzt der Zustimmung oder Ablehnung des Patienten. Handelt ein Arzt ohne Zustimmung des Patienten, begeht er eine Körperverletzung. Der Arzt hängt also von der Entscheidung des Patienten ab. Wenn ein Patient bei Bewusstsein und volljährig ist und nicht unter dem Einfluss Dritter steht, d. h. wenn er kompetent ist, wird er sein Selbstbestimmungsrecht problemfrei wahrnehmen können,

soweit er durch eine ärztliche Aufklärung die notwendigen Informationen erhält, die ihn neben seinen intrinsischen Fähigkeiten in die Lage versetzen, eine Entscheidung treffen zu können.

Anders sieht es mit den Vorausverfügungen aus, die Personen verfassen, um auch am Lebensende ihre Autonomie ausüben zu können. Die Vorsorgevollmacht und die Betreuungsverfügung sind Formen stellvertretender Autonomie. Eine bevollmächtigte Person soll dringliche (medizinische) Entscheidungen für den und im Sinne des Vollmachtgebenden treffen, wenn er selbst dies nicht mehr kann. Die Patientenverfügung gilt als besondere Form der Vorausverfügung, weil eine kompetente Person für sich als einmal nicht mehr kompetente Person prospektiv ohne die sonst notwendige Aufklärung medizinische Entscheidungen trifft, die seit 2009 in Deutschland verbindlich sind.

An dieser Stelle fangen nun die ethisch relevanten Probleme an, die mit der Frage zusammenhängen, was der Begriff Autonomie in diesem Kontext bedeutet. Schon in den 1990er Jahren hat es in den USA eine Debatte über das Autonomieverständnis in Verbindung mit Vorausverfügungen gegeben. Diese Debatte wiederzubeleben lohnt sich, da mit der rechtlichen Regelung die Probleme der Bedeutung und Reichweite des Begriffs Autonomie nicht gelöst sind. Eine philosophische Begriffsklärung erscheint notwendig. Daher will ich mich kritisch mit zwei gegensätzlichen Positionen - einer individualistischen und einer relationalen - auseinandersetzen und dabei einen neuen Lösungsvorschlag vorstellen.

Section:	Ethics & Political Philosophy
Language:	German
Chair:	Marcel Warmt
Date:	17:30-18:00, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 104

Dorothea Kotalik (Universität Potsdam, Germany)
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Why Should the Problem of Religious Disagreement be Taken Seriously?

Iurii Kozik

My talk will be dedicated to the important problem Philosophy of Religion faces today – the disagreement among diverse religious traditions. The problem is understood as a state of affairs where different religions assert contradictory and incompatible truth-claims on the subjects as nature of God or Salvation. The problem is addressed to Christian philosophers who believe that only claims of their own religion are truthful while statements of other belief systems are false. The recent discussion spreads between positions of people who push the problem forward and propose a philosophical hypothesis to answer them ("pluralists") and those who deny that holding a view that only one religion is true is wrong, both morally or epistemologically ("exclusivist"). One of the most well-know proponents of pluralism is John Hick. Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen can be taken as defenders of exclusivism. Three attitudes toward the problem are possible:

1) To accept both the problem and a pluralist solution (i.e., that not only one tradition is true but others, or at least some of them, are true as well).

2) To accept the problem, but reject the pluralist solution.

3) To accept neither the problem nor the pluralist solution.

In my talk I will address the philosophers whose views belong to the third category. I will examine the critical responses to Hick made by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen who deny the philosophical challenges of religious disagreement. They both stand on exclusivist ground and argue that the disagreement of religions doesn't make any problem for a Christian faith. I aim to answer to their criticism and justify why problem of disagreement should be taken seriously.

Section:	Philosophy of Religion
Language:	English
Chair:	Alexander Gebharter
Date:	16:00-16:30, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 107

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Contemporary Attitudes Towards Toulmin's Model

Iuliia Krisheminska

Questions related to the field of argumentation hold a special
place in the history of philosophy. Many researchers applied
to the problem of finding universal standards for argument
defining and evaluation in different fields of study. A consid-
erable role in this was played by the Vienna Circle and their conception
of logical positivism that caused using the apparatus of mathematical
logic.

A significant contribution in reflection upon these issues in the XX
century was made by notable British philosopher Steven Toulmin. In
his work "Uses of argument" he suggested a new model of argumenta-
tion that is "more perfect" than Aristotle's one.

According to this, in the formal valid way can be expressed argu-
ments of the kind "Data; Warrant; So, Claim" (substantial arguments)
and "Data; Backing; So, Claim" (analytic arguments).

Proving his position, the philosopher appealed to the past thinkers
contributions. Particularly these were Herbert Hard's reflections about
refutations, Isaac Newton's view on using our observations of regulari-

ties as the backing for a novel warrant and Gilbert Ryle's arguing that only warrant-using arguments should be referred to as inferences.

Current researchers' positions about Toulmin's model are highlighted in a special volume of the interdisciplinary journal "Argumentation". In these articles authors referred to different aspects. For instance, Lilian Bermejo-Luque wrote about the specter of relativism, while Olaf Tans mentioned the complexities of practical reasoning. Apart from this were analyzed components of this new model by James Klummp and Wouter Slob.

Overall, exploring Toulmin's model is valuable for reconsideration of a current level of argumentation in academic researching. Invented for analysis within jurisprudence, it was spread widely to rhetoric, communication and lately to computer sciences. These notable examples emphasize that Toulmin's ideas are relevant.

Section:	History of Logic & Argumentation Theory
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian Wimmer
Date:	15:30-16:00, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 104

Iuliia Krisheminska (National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine)
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On How did Russell Underestimate Frege

Adam Kubiak

Bertrand Russell in his essay "On Denoting" (1905) presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in paper "On Sense and Reference" (1892). The aim of the talk will be to examine Russell's paper in order to show to what extent he was misguided to depreciate Frege's ideas.

Firstly, I will discuss two claims of Russell, that are insinuating about Frege. Secondly I will try to show, what Russell has passed over. Namely that Frege's theory provides some answers for at least two out of three puzzles presented by Russell in his essay.

Russell's first depreciation was that he derived conclusion that Frege builds conventional denotations such as null-classes. But Frege would treat presented by Russell examplary conditionals as a special case, where its constituents have neither independent meaning nor independent denotation. Frege would say that these complex expressions denotes a truth-value independently from its parts. The second misguided objection to Frege starts with an observation: "When we wish to speak about the meaning of a denoting phrase, as opposed to its denotation, the natural mode of doing so is by inverted commas" (p.485-486). Russell ends with a conclusion, that the relation between meaning and denotation involves mysterious difficulties. For Frege, in order to speak of the sense of an expression "A" one may simply use the phrase "the sense of the expression "A"". Other way is to use reported speech. Neither the statement, nor the examples given by Russell satisfy any of these two rules. For Frege, inverted commas themselves are used for making signs of signs, to speak of the words themselves, and not of their senses.

With respect to the first puzzle Frege's solution is to use the salva veritate rule in a proper way, namely to change constituents in such a way as to preserve the same meaning, because in reported speech reference shifts to meanings. With respect to the second puzzle Frege could answer, that since the propositions in the puzzle contain proper names with no reference, then they do not have logical values, so they do not violate any logical law. Finally with respect to the third puzzle, one might answer, that the puzzled proposition simply means that A

and B have the same references, but that works only in one particular case.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Alexander auf der Straße
Date:	12:15-12:45, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

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Pluralism in Science

Martin Kusch

This talk is a critical discussion of recent work on pluralism in science, especially: Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, C. Kenneth Waters, eds. Scientific Pluralism, 2006; Sandra Mitchell, Unsimple Truths, 2009; Hasok Chang, Is Water H2O? 2012; and Helen Longino, Studying Human Behavior, 2013.

Taking these (and some other) recent texts as my starting point, I begin by separating different forms and strengths of pluralism and monism. In drawing lines between these different forms and strengths, I shall use categories familiar from discussions on relativism. In the process I shall seek to clarify the relations between (different forms of) pluralism and monism on the one hand, and (different forms of) realism and antirealism, or (different forms of) relativism and absolutism, on the other hand. I shall also distinguish between different argumentative strategies for defending pluralist or monist positions.

In the main part of my paper, I shall focus on Chang's manifesto for – what he calls – "active normative epistemic pluralism". Chang's pluralism stands out for its philosophical and political boldness: it comes with revisionist philosophical accounts of knowledge, truth, success, and realism; it attacks and rejects a host of positions in epistemology and the philosophy of science (e.g. the view that knowledge is true belief plus X; the causal theory of reference, scientific realism, inference to the best explanation, the significance of underdetermination); it uses pluralist ideas to reassess central developments in the history of science (both as res gestae and as historia rerum gestarum); it suggest a new role for the field of History and Philosophy of Science (i.e. to function as "complementary science"); and it puts forward pluralist proposals on how science should be conducted, financed, directed, distributed and taught (e.g. defending the idea that creationism should be part of the biology school curriculum).

Much as I welcome and admire the boldness and originality of several aspects of Chang's work, I am not convinced by several of his claims and his evidence for them. Here is an (incomplete and initial) list of my discontents:

(1) Chang seems to me to exaggerate the extent to which the sciences themselves and the philosophy of science are dominated by so-

called "monism". The problem is aggravated by Chang's tendency to equate monism with reductionism, foundationalism, scientific realism and inevitabilist renderings of the history of science. Positions previously presented in the literature as moderate forms of monism are either ignored or subsumed under pluralism.

(2) Social Studies of Science are almost completely absent from Chang's book. This is problematic since considering scientific work as tied to social contexts would make it much less plausible to reason counterfactually-abstractly about where, say, the Phlogiston theory might have got to, had it been kept alive for longer. Considering science as a social phenomenon might also invite reflections on whether certain forms of monism or unification might not be functionally necessary to the pursuit of science.

(3) Chang does not sufficiently consider the costs (of various kinds) of practicing science in a pluralist mode. He tends to assume that it is almost always better for science and society if several (incommensurable) research practices work in parallel, and if the foundations of all paradigms are challenged by radical alternatives. This does not strike me as obviously true. Given constraints of science budgets - whether public or private - we simply do not always have the means to finance many competing research programmes. Or we might sometimes reasonably think that less rather than more fundamental challenges are what scientific effort requires in order to succeed.

(4) Chang's redefinitions of "truth" and "knowledge" strike me as too radical and as unnecessary given his goals. There are many accounts of truth and knowledge in the literature that would serve the purposes of the pluralist.

(5) Finally, I am sceptical about the idea of HPS as a complimentary science that brings back to life research programmes decades or centuries after they have disappeared. In part my scepticism is rooted in problems already adduced above. But it is also anchored in doubts about Chang's own prime example of a successful instance of complimentary science, that is, the case of superheating of water.

Section:	Plenary Talk
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian J. Feldbacher
Date:	16:30-18:00, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 101

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Martin Kusch (University of Vienna, Austria)

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Practical Reasoning and the Normative (In)Significance of Desires

Stefan Leber

In recent years, desire-based theories of practical reasons have been under heavy attack. The list of critics includes metaethicists like Scanlon, Darwall, Dancy or Halbig. They argue that desires do not have the normative significance Humeans have commonly been ascribing to them. Instead, reasons are desire-independent. In other words: desires are normatively insignificant.

One common and frequently applied strategy to establish the nor-

mative insignificance of desires is a closer analysis of what goes on in our heads during practical deliberation. Following this strategy, critics of desire-based accounts bring up one version or another of, as I will call it, the "argument from unrealistic practical deliberation":

1. According to desire-based views, practical reasoning only consists in the assessment of our desires and their respective strength.

2. That is a highly unrealistic picture of what goes on during practical reasoning.

3. Therefore, desire-based theories of reasons are false.

Evaluating this argument, my conclusion will be that it is unsound, because it relies on an implausible presupposition itself. More concretely, it is presupposed that desires would have to be consciously reflected upon in order to be normatively significant. This, however, is simply wrong. The metaphysical question "What is a normative reason?" is independent of any psychological claim about conscious processes during practical deliberation. I will close with a prospect on possibilities to interpret the phenomenology of practical reasoning in the framework of desire-based reasons.

Section:	Ethics & Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Hendrik Kempt
Date:	10:45-11:15, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

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Knowledge and the Problem of Transparency

Yven Johannes Leist

ost philosophers do not believe that knowledge is transparent (i.e. that I always know that I know). I will argue (against Timothy Williamson) that transparency is a necessary feature of knowledge. The transparency principle can be seen as the conjunction of the following two theses, where K stands for "the subject X knows that":

(i) $K\varphi \rightarrow KK\varphi$

(ii) $\neg K\varphi \rightarrow K\neg K\varphi$

To show that transparency does not hold Williamson gives the well-known example of a person N.N. believing Lincoln to be President even though Lincoln has just been assassinated. Since the subject N.N. in the example (reasonably) believes that he knows p (P1) and p is false (P2), N.N. does not know p (since falsehoods cannot be known). But then we have a counterexample to (ii), since N.N. does not know p, but he does not know that he does not know p. So transparency must be false.

To defend the principle of transparency the only option would seem to argue that (P1) is wrong. Williamson tries to ward of a potential attack against (P1), by making explicit his premiss that empirical scepticism does not hold. I will argue that subscribing to a specific form of empirical scepticism is indeed the only option to defend the principle of transparency and will try to argue why this is not as problematic as it may seem.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Martha Cassidy-Brinn
Date:	11:15-11:45, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 105

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Priority Monism and Time

Ben Hsien-pin Liao

onathan Schaffer argues for the necessary truth of Priority Monism (PM): the view that there is one basic fundamental concrete object - the universe (the maximal concrete whole), that the universe has proper parts, and that the universe whole is prior to its parts. (Schaffer, 2010) He defends the view by claiming that the view is supported by our best scientific theories (argument from emergence, argument from metaphysical possibility), and by defraying the worry that monism cannot explain the heterogeneous nature of the universe (objection from heterogeneity).

In my paper, I critically assess Schaffer's arguments and assumptions. In particular, I formulate temporal analogues to the extant objection from heterogeneity; viz. how can it be meaningful to say the universe's temporal parts is derivative of the temporal whole (the entire trajectory of the universe's lifespan)? What must the metaphysics be like for the truthmaker of propositions to be partially "located" in the future? I argue that the priority monist has sufficient resources to answer these temporal variants of objections from heterogeneity.

However, I raise a much more serious worry that, if sound, undermines PM's scientific basis, its assumption of classical mereology, and the legitimacy of its appeal to metaphysical possibility. The basis of these objections derives from the consideration that classical continuous spacetime may be emergent at some kind of limit. Numerous approaches to a quantum theory of gravity posit that fundamental ontology will exclude spacetime, either partially or wholly. (Huggett and Wüthrich, forthcoming) If spacetime is emergent, then, PM (i) loses its claim as a theory about the fundamental structure of the world, and (ii) the assumption of classical mereology that constitutes the core of PM is ineffectual.

References:
Huggett, N. and C. Wüthrich (forthcoming). "Emergent spacetime and empirical (in)coherence", Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
Schaffer, J (2010). "Monism: the priority of the whole", Philosophical Review 119, 31-76.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Luca Gili
Date:	14:00-14:30, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

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Die Logik der Stoa

Ulrich Lobis

Die Stoa wird in erster Linie auf ihre Leistungen in der praktischen Philosophie verkürzt und nicht in ihrem gesamten Wirken betrachtet. So zum Beispiel entwickelte sie auch eine eigenständige Logik, die aber bis ins 19. und 20. Jahrhundert hinein ignoriert worden ist.

Eines der Hauptmerkmale der stoischen Logik ist es, drei "sprachschichten" zu unterscheiden, nämlich das Bezeichnende, das Bezeichnete und den Gegenstand. Das Bezeichnete, das von den Stoikern "Lekton" genannt wurde, unterscheidet sie radikal von den anderen Strömungen und hebt sie beispielsweise von der aristotelischen Logik ab.

Der Vortrag soll erstens einen groben Überblick über das logische System der Stoa geben, dann im Hauptteil auf seine Eigenheiten eingehen und schlussendlich versuchen, den Bogen zur Gegenwart zu spannen. So sollten auch Punkte behandelt werden, inwieweit die Logik in der Stoa für ihr gesamtes System eine Rolle gespielt hat und gegen das Vorurteil antreten, die Stoa würde sich in Lebensregeln und Ratschlägen erschöpfen.

Section:	History of Logic & Argumentation Theory
Language:	German
Chair:	Christian Wimmer
Date:	14:00-14:30, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 104

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Das Quine'sche Ontologiekriterium

Jonathan Lukic

Welche Entitäten bzw. welche Arten von Entitäten setzt eine Theorie als existierend voraus? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage formuliert Quine ein sog. Ontologiekriterium. Mehrere Formulierungen dieses Kriteriums sind in seinen Schriften zu finden - sinngemäß besagen sie, dass die Ontologie einer Theorie genau diejenigen Objekte enthält, welche in den Bereichen der gebundenen Variablen enthalten sein müssen, damit die Sätze der Theorie wahr sind (vgl. Quine 1951, p. 11).

Quine veröffentlicht sein Kriterium nie in einer formalisierten Form, sondern gibt lediglich Hinweise, wie solch eine Formalisierung aussehen könnte. In einer Antwort an Hintikka gibt Quine den Hinweis, dass die Interpretation (der nicht-logischen Konstanten) einer Theorie fixiert und die Bereiche der gebundenen Variablen variiert werden müssen. Die Ontologie einer Theorie enthält dann genau diejenigen Objekte bzw. Arten von Objekten, welche in allen variierten Bereichen der gebundenen Variablen enthalten sind (vgl. Quine 1968, p. 287).

Es gibt zahlreiche Rekonstruktionsversuche des Quine'schen Kriteriums. Die von Hinst stammende Rekonstruktion ist die einzige, welche den obigen Hinweis Quines auf die Variation der Bereiche der gebundenen Variablen berücksichtigt (vgl. Hinst 1983, p. 199ff). Hinsts Rekonstruktion scheitert jedoch daran, dass die Existenzvoraussetzungen einer Theorie "extensionalisiert" werden, was jedoch nicht in Quines Sinne ist (vgl. Quine 1968, p. 287).

Ziel dieses Vortrages ist eine Rekonstruktion des Quine'schen Kriteriums, welche sich teilweise an Hinsts Rekonstruktion orientiert.

Literatur

P. Hinst: "Quines Ontologiekriterium", Erkenntnis 19,1983, pp.193-215.

W.V.O. Quine: "Ontology and Ideology", Philosophical Studies 2, 1951

W.V.O. Quine: "Reply to Hintikka", Synthese 19, 1968, pp.284-287.

Section: Metaphysics & Ontology
Language: German
Chair: Florian Fischer
Date: 10:45-11:15, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location: HS 101

❧

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Kollektive Intentionalität als Integrierte Information

Martin Maga

Thema meines Vortrags ist sowohl die Philosophie des Geistes als auch die Philosophie der Kollektiven Intentionalität. Die Leitfrage meiner philosophischen Untersuchung lautet:

(a) Ist Kollektive Intentionalität prinzipiell möglich?

(b) Wie ist es insbesondere möglich, individuelle Einstellungen von Akteuren einer Gruppe zu einer einzigen Einstellung der Gruppe als Einheit zu aggregieren?

Die Zielsetzung meines Vortrages ist die Darstellung eines Lösungsansatzes des Aggregationsproblems individueller Einstellungen

wie es von Christian List und Philip Pettit beschrieben wird (List; Pettit, Group Agency, 2011, Oxford University Press). Meine Kernthese ist, dass eine modifizierte Form der integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) von Giulio Tononi (Tononi, Consciousness as Integrated Information, 2008, Biol. Bull.) das Aggregationsproblem für ein Kollektiv löst, das durch einen sozialen Mechanismus vorstrukturiert ist. Mein Hauptargument ist, dass das konzeptionelle Substrat des Modells von Gruppenagenten nach List und Pettit auf der einen Seite mit dem konzeptionellen Substrat des Modells vom Bewusstsein nach Tononi auf der anderen Seite strukturgleich ist. Deshalb kann die IIT auf das Aggregationsproblem angewendet werden. Resultat meiner Analyse ist (a) ein intuitiv zugänglicher sowie mathematisch solider Lösungsansatz für das Problem der Aggregation individueller Einstellungen, (b) eine positive Antwort auf die Frage nach der Möglichkeit Kollektiver Intentionalität, (c) eine bestimmte Interpretation der IIT, die es zulässt von einem Kollektivbewusstsein (Kollektiv-Phi) sowie von kollektiven Qualia (Kollektiv-Qualia) zusprechen. Zur Diskussion stehen einige kritische Stellen der IIT sowie der Gültigkeitsbereich eines Unmöglichkeitstheorems für Aggregationsfunktionen.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	German
Chair:	Sebastian Müller
Date:	11:45-12:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 107

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Two-Dimensionalism and Propositions

Jonathan Mai

Structuralists hold that propositions have components and a certain structure that is determined by the structure of the sentences that express them. David Chalmers has recently proposed a two-dimensionalist version of structuralism according to which propositions are pairs of structures. Each such pair is composed of a complex of primary intensions and a complex of secondary intensions. Secondary intensions are functions from possible worlds to appropriate extensions and primary intensions are functions from scenarios to appropriate extensions. Scenarios are complete ways the world might have turned out to be, constrained only by a priori knowledge.

In my paper I want to raise two objections to Chalmers' structuralism. My first objection will show that we have no reason to believe that Chalmers' structuralism is really a version of structuralism. We have such a reason only if there is a reason for believing that Chalmers-propositions are struc- tured. However there is such a reason only if the structure of Chalmers-propositions must be appealed to in the explanation of hyperintensional phenomena Chalmers' structuralism provides. But Chalmers' structuralism explains the relevant data only by considering non-standard worlds, i.e. scenarios, and no appeal to structure is necessary.

My second objection is that Chalmers-propositions are so "fine-grained" that we face a serious set-theoretic problem, if propositions are Chalmers-propositions. For if propositions are Chalmers-propositions there is a one-to-one function from the power set of the set of propositions into the set of propositions in contradiction to Cantor's theorem. Chalmers has recently claimed that this paradox is a version of Kaplan's paradox and so can be dealt with quite easily. I will argue against that claim.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Theresa Marx
Date:	14:45-15:15, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

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Intuition: Culture and Credit

Dejan Makovec

According to Ernest Sosa, intuition figures as a foundational source of knowledge in philosophy and other a priori disciplines. In terms of his virtue epistemology, a knowing subject should deserve credit for truly believing an intuitively known content. Knowledge is apt true believe due to a competence on the part of the subject. True beliefs due to lucky guesses or Gettier-type situations do not qualify as knowledge, because they do not manifest a relevant competence.

One important factor of intuitive justification is the ruling out of intuitive attractions due to probably misplaced enculturation. Such bad enculturation may take the form of deep seated prejudice or superstition. On the other hand, there is little to cite in favor of a true intuitive attraction, except the very proposition triggering one's intuitive assent. Plausibly, such true intuitions are similar to lucky guesses and thereby disqualify as creditable justification and knowledge.

My aim is to point out a similarity between Jennifer Lackey's criticism of Sosa's virtue epistemology from testimony and the present issue. The CHICAGO VISITOR case presents a subject asking a passerby for directions to the Sears Tower. The subject is provided with precise information and knows her way, but arguably all the relevant credit goes to the passerby.

Omitting further detail here, a similar dilemma arises for Sosa's account of intuition mutatis mutandis. I argue that "think twice" would be a strange epistemic virtue in the case of enculturation, just as "look twice" or "ask twice" would be in the cases of perception and testimony; the same goes for "gather more knowledge about the subject matter". In unreflective intuition (all) credit seems to go to the subject's culture.

Either the notion of creditworthiness is robust enough to rule out mere enculturation, but then neither is credit deserved in large parts of alleged intuitive beliefs, such as $4 > 3$ or egalitarian virtues imply tolerance; or the notion is weak enough to permit credit in most cases of unreflective intuiting, but then, too, credit is deserved in cases of enculturation.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Martha Cassidy-Brinn
Date:	10:30-11:00, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 105

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Attention and Cognitive Penetration in Visual Consciousness

Francesco Marchi

n this talk I will address Jesse Prinz's recent effort to provide the debate about consciousness with a renewed perspective. In his recent book The conscious brain (2012) Prinz aims to build up a coherent theory for visual conscious experience by adopting the framework of the intermediate level theory of consciousness (ILTC), first developed by Ray Jackendoff in 1987. The general idea of this computational theory is that the flow of information processing in the brain can ideally be divided in three stages or levels. To each one of these levels corresponds a specific representation of the visual input. The most important claim, however, is that only the representation associated with the intermediate level presents a sufficient degree of both organization and phenomenal similarity to be suitable to become conscious. I will present the core elements of Prinz's proposal and discuss why I believe that his account presents at least two critical aspects that need to be discussed carefully, since they might reveal two correspondent problems for his entire framework. The first point focuses on the notion of intermediate level representations, which I will characterize and then criticize from two different points of view. In particular, I believe that this notion is far too general and underspecified to be considered as a useful explanatory device or an adequate functional component of the theory, while, on the other hand, it doesn't provide a consistent account of the phenomenon of cognitive penetration, for which I will present some supporting evidence. The second problem concerns Attention, considered by Prinz as the only necessary and sufficient top-down process for consciousness. I will show that there is evidence for a dissociation of attention and consciousness, thus undermining the idea of attention being necessary for consciousness. Finally I will address other top-down processes that may play an important role in the arising of consciousness, thereby arguing that attention is also not sufficient.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Tae-Kyung Kim
Date:	09:00-09:30, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 107

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Styles of Scientific Reasoning and Pluralist Theories of Truth

Marco Marletta

In my paper I will focus on the conception of truth implied by Ian Hacking's theory of the styles of scientific reasoning; in particular I will develop his recent suggestion that such theory entails a pluralist conception of truth similar to Crispin Wright's one. Therefore at first I will introduce the notion of style of reasoning and I will discuss the virtuous circle which links styles of reasoning to the truth. In fact, although experience is the ultimate tribunal of scientific statements, Hacking claims that the correspondence theory of truth is not enough to explain scientific knowledge at all, since it does not apply to styles. A style is the condition for the possibility of scientific statements in a certain scientific field, i.e., it enables the formulation of candidates for truth-or-falsehood (verifiable or falsifiable assertions in scientific discourses): styles do not determine the truth value of statements (this role pertains to reality), but rather they create the possibility of truth- value attributions. A statement can be true only within a style, but we know that a style is good just because it gets at the truth. Since styles are historical and field-dependent things, there are different standards of truth-or-falsehood in distinct domains.

Consequently, at second, I will argue that these observations lead to a pluralistic theory of truth, which affirms that the property of truth diverges across different domains of discourse. Although this family of theories of truth was born to account for the different ways of being true of propositions from different discipline such as science, ethics, aesthetics and mathematics, its intuitions can be valid also within scientific knowledge if (following Hacking's theory) we assume that scientific truth behaves differently according to contexts, domains and methods of verification. However, such an extension of pluralist theories is possible only after a revision of the concept of "domain of discourse" which justifies the emergence of truth-or- falsehood candidates from their respective fields.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Dejan Markovec
Date:	14:45-15:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 105

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Two-Dimensionalism and Interpretation

Johannes Marti

Stalnaker's metasemantic interpretation of two-dimensional semantics provides a formal framework for the interpretation of utterances in a discourse (Stalnaker. Assertion. In Peter Cole, editor, Syntax and Semantics, Volume 9: Pragmatics. 1978.) (Stalnaker. Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics. Philosophical Studies. 2004). The original purpose of the framework was to explain how sentences expressing necessary truths can be informative. To this aim the truth value of an utterance is relativized to possible worlds in two different dimensions. First, the truth value of the utterance depends on the facts holding at a possible world in the standard sense in which the truth value of the proposition expressed by the utterance can depend on the facts that the proposition is about. Second, what proposition is expressed by an utterance can itself depend on the semantic facts that hold in the context of the conversation. Examples of this second kind of dependence that were given in the literature are: Indexical expressions, a Kripkean causal mechanism that selects the referents of proper names depending on the causal history of the name at the context of utterance, or conversations in which the participants have a misunderstanding about the meaning of words.

In my presentation I suggest to use the two-dimensional framework under a metasemantic interpretation as a, no doubt vastly oversimplified, framework to model the problem of radical interpretation. The problem of radical interpretation is to give an account of how an interpreter can learn about a subject's beliefs and language given only observational evidence and no prior knowledge of her beliefs and language (Davidson. Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press. 1984) (Lewis. Radical interpretation. Synthese, 27, 1974).

In the application of the two-dimensional framework to the problem of radical interpretation sets of possible worlds represent the totality of the subject's beliefs. This is a standard procedure in doxastic logic and a natural adaption of Stalnaker's idea to use sets of worlds for common ground in a conversation. I argue that then the two dimensions of two-dimensional semantics correspond to the two the two unknowns, beliefs and language, in interpretation. In the first dimension the basic

facts of a possible world determine the truth value of a proposition and give the contend of the subject's basic beliefs. In the second dimension the semantic facts of a possible world determine what proposition is expressed by an utterance and how the subject uses language.

As the basic evidence available for interpretation Davidson has proposed the notion of the subject holding a sentence true in her own language. I show that if we model this notion in the two-dimensional framework it corresponds to the expression of the diagonal proposition which Stalnaker proposed for the reinterpretation of certain pragmatically problematic assertions.

On the most straightforward account all the linguistic evidence that is available for interpretation is what sentence the subject holds true under various circumstances. This only constraints the diagonal entries in the matrices of subject's sentences. It does not suffice to distinguish between a difference in content across contexts from a mere change in the facts that sentence is about. This might be taken as an indication that the two-dimensional framework in which a sentence in context expresses a proposition is too rich for the problem of radical interpretation. One might simplify the model to a essentially one-dimensional one in which only the truth values of sentences in context are represented.

If one however wishes to retain the full two-dimensional framework one has to find additional evidence that can constrain the truth values of sentences in the subject's language at indices that are distinct from the context of utterance. I discuss two suggestion of how this might be accomplished that correspond to fundamentally distinct conceptions of the semantic facts that are modeled in the second dimension.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Theresa Marx
Date:	14:00-14:30, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

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Was ist ein rationaler Sprecher?

Theresa Marx

In der pragmatischen Strömung der Sprachphilosophie ist es gemeinhin üblich (1) , die Erklärungsansätze zum tatsächlichen Sprachgebrauch und der Kommunikation von Bedeutungen der Prämisse unterzuordnen, man habe es bei den handelnden Subjekten mit sogenannten "rational speakers" zu tun. Allerdings hat bisher keiner diese dem Sprecher unterstellte Rationalität genauer definiert.

Bei Grice finden wir jedoch Hinweise darauf, dass er durchaus an eine bestimmte Art von Rationalität denkt, die dem rationalen Sprecher zu eigen ist. So behauptet er beispielsweise, dass die Richtlinien, denen eine korrekt ausgeführte sprachliche Bemerkung folgt, auf generellen Prinzipien beruhen, die möglicherweise für jede Art rationalen Verhaltens gelten. (2) Erfolgreich zu kommunizieren ist also nur eine weitere Art, sich rational zu verhalten. (3) Charakteristisch für die Rationalität, wie Grice sie augenscheinlich versteht, ist die allgemeine Zielgerichtetheit des Verhaltens und eben auch des Sprechens, die Verfolgung eigener Interessen dabei, ebenso wie der Bezug auf den Kontext, in dem der (Sprech-)Akt stattfindet. (4)

In meinem Vortrag werde ich untersuchen, wie man aus den Hinweisen, die Grice uns liefert, eine Definition der Rationalität des Sprechers erarbeiten kann und welche Beziehung diese zu den bekanntesten ökonomischen und psychologischen Theorien etabliert.

Dabei werde ich zeigen, dass die Grice'sche Auffassung von Rationalität zu sehr den klassischen homo-oeconomicus-Theorien (5) gleicht, um der Kritik modernerer (Verhaltens-)Ökonomen (6) standhalten zu können.

Das heißt jedoch nicht, dass wir die Vorstellung eines rationalen Sprechers als Grundlage unserer Theoriebildung endgültig aufgeben müssen. Vielmehr bedarf es eines neuen Verständnisses von Rationalität, das die unbewussten funktionalen Prozesse in ein Gesamtbild der rational agierenden Person integriert, anstatt sie in den Bereich des Dunklen und Irrationalen zu verbannen.

Ich werde abschließend aufzeigen, wie uns eine solche Neudefinition von Rationalität helfen kann, den Begriff des "rational speakers" aufrecht zu erhalten und erfolgreich im Gesamtgefüge der pragmatis-

chen Sprachphilosophie zu verwenden.

1 Siehe u.A. Grice 1989, Sperber und Wilson 1995, Carston 2012.
2 Grice 1989, S. 20.
3 Ebd., S. 28
4 Ebd., S. 26, 28, 30
5 Siehe u.A. Hutchinson 1938, Friedman 1953.
6 Siehe u.A. Kahneman und Tversky 1984, Simon 1986, Gigerenzer
2008.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	German
Chair:	Alexander auf der Straße
Date:	10:45-11:15, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

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Bending the Rules … and why it might not always be a bad thing

Alexander G. Mirnig

It is nowadays a widely accepted fact in philosophy of science (and applied science in general) that the desired results of a certain research should not dictate the actual research process and certainly never influence the actual research results. We argue that, while certainly being a very sensible attitude to take, too rigid an interpretation of these mantras might not always be the best idea either. We present an anecdotal example of a case in HCI (usability evaluation of a modeling application) where a reexamination of unsatisfactory results - that occurred solely because said results had turned out as unsatisfactory as they did - led to a richer, more useful and ultimately much more detailed result than it would have otherwise.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Florian Boge
Date:	11:30-12:00, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 105

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Knowledge and Practical Reasoning

Andreas Mueller

hat is the relation between knowledge and practical reasoning? Several philosophers have argued that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. Their exact proposal is this:

"The Reason-Knowledge Principle henceforth referred to as RKP: Where one's choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p." (See: Hawthorne, John, and Stanley, Jason (2008). "Knowledge and Action." Journal of Philosophy, Vol.105, No. 10.)

I will summarize various arguments against the RKP found in the recent literature. I shall point out why the preferred defense of the proponents of the RKP, the excuse-maneuver, does not work. My diagnosis for the failure of the RKP is that some norms simply do not translate into simple biconditionals. One consequence of this is the need to distinguish between epistemic norms for practical reasoning and epistemic conditions for practical rationality. I will then focus on the former notion. I will give a new argument for the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. I argue that the aim of practical reasoning is determining a course of action in which we can bring it about that we non-accidentally achieve our goals. I then go on to argue that knowledge is the epistemic state best suited to realize this aim. Finally, I defend this thesis against the previously introduced counterexamples. In order to do that, I will rely on a certain understanding of normativity. I argue that knowledge is a normative ideal for practical reasoning whose application is defeasible. This means while the knowledge-norm generally holds, its application to particular cases may be suspended. Not all non-compliance with the norm must lead to the assessment of a person as irrational because she fails to meet the norm.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Martha Cassidy-Brinn
Date:	09:00-09:30, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 105

Andreas Mueller (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University Frankfurt, Germany)
Andreas Mueller (M.A.), received from Goethe University Frankfurt in 2011. Andreas is interested in epistemology, methaethics and theories about reasons and rationality. He is currently a member of the research cluster "The Emergence of Normative Orders" in Frankfurt where he focusses on writing a dissertation concerning pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.
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The Fatal Flaw in Chalmers' Argument Against Materialism

Sebastian Müller

In his The Conscious Mind (1996) and some recent papers, David Chalmers argues against materialism with a new version of the modal argument.

   i. P $\&\neg$Q is conceivable.

   ii. If P $\&\neg$Q is conceivable, then P$\&\neg$Q is 1-possible.

   iii. If P $\&\neg$Q is 1-possible, then P$\&\neg$Q is 2-possible or Russellian monism is true.

   iv. If P$\&\neg$Q is 2-possible, materialism is false.

   v. Materialism is false or Russellian monism is true. (Chalmers 2010, 152.)

Here, "P" stands for the microphysical truths, while "Q" stands for the phenomenal truths. So, the argument runs from the conceivability of

the absence of some phenomenal truths while all physical ones are kept intact to their 1- and 2-possibility, and, from there, to the falsehood of materialism.

While this argument has been discussed by many philosophers, they have almost exclusively focused on premises i, ii and iii.

In contrast to this, I will show that premise iv of this argument is wrong. While there are strong connections between classical metaphysical modality and actuality, the relation between Chalmers' 2-possibility, which is entirely based on logical-conceptual possibility and actuality are not strong enough to justify premise iv.

Chalmers offers only very weak arguments to justify iv, although he admits that this premise is problematic. He argues that firstly, materialism is a modal thesis, so of course the analysis of modality will give us insights into materialism. Against this, I will show that materialism is only to be understood as a modal thesis if Chalmers' picture modality is wrong, and vice versa.

Secondly, he claims that there are obvious relations between logical-conceptual modality and actuality. While I will agree with him on that, I will show that these relations are not of the right kind to justify a premise as bold as iv.

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Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Tae-Kyung Kim
Date:	11:15-11:45, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 107

Sebastian Müller (Bielefeld University, Germany)
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A System of Temporal Logic with Operators of Contingency

Matteo Pascucci

Following a tradition of study that begins with Montgomery and Routley in the Sixties, we consider a logic with primitive operators of contingency. More precisely, we explore the use of an operator of past contingency and an operator of future contingency in a system S of temporal logic whose language includes a propositional constant.

Given the axiomatic basis for S, we prove that:

(i) the usual operators of past necessity and future necessity are definable in S by means of the propositional constant and our primitive operators;

(ii) S is sound and complete with respect to a class C of temporal models.

Each model in C is defined as a 4-tuple (T, $<$,$>$, v) where T is a non-empty set of instants t; $<$ is the temporal relation "before" (t$<$t' means that t is before t'), $>$ is the temporal relation "after" (t$>$t' means that t is after t') and v is a valuation function assigning to every atomic formula of the language the set of instants at which that formula is true. We also prove that our axiomatic basis for S grants a fundamental intuition about temporal series, ie. the fact that $<$ and $>$ are reciprocally converse (if t$<$t' then t'$>$t and the other way round). According to Arthur Prior, this property is required for every normal system of temporal logic.

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Section:	Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Christine Schurz
Date:	09:45-10:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 104

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Matteo Pascucci (University of Verona, Italy)
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Kantian Contractualism and the Separation between the Moral and the Political

Herlinde Pauer-Studer

Several philosophers have argued that a Kantian form of contractualism offers a highly plausible framework for moral theory. The most prominent examples are Thomas Scanlon's conception of morality in "What We Owe to Each Other" (1998) and Stephen Darwall's account of morality in "The Second-Person Standpoint. Morality, Respect and Accountability" (2006). These conceptions of contractualism are distinct from a Hobbesian form of contractualism since they are not based on a self-interest conception of rationality and try to justify deontological principles by relying on reason-based agreements. In my talk I am going to assess these accounts of Kantian contractualism. My main criticism will be that Scanlon's and Darwall's versions of contractualism blur the distinction between the moral and the political, i.e. between personal and public morality.

I try to show that both authors thereby depart from a crucial principle in Kant's practical philosophy, which we have good reason not to give up. My claim (supported with several examples, among them the arguments developed by several Nazi legal theorists for unifying the moral, the political and the legal) will be that a moral theory should respect the Kantian separation between "internal" and "external freedom".

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Section:	Plenary Talk
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian J. Feldbacher
Date:	16:30-18:00, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

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Herlinde Pauer-Studer (University of Vienna, Austria)
Herlinde Pauer-Studer is Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna. Her area of specialization is in: Analytic Philosophy, Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy. Amongst others she raised an ERC Advanced Research Grant (2009), was Fulbright Research Scholar at New York University (2006) and Faculty Fellow at the E.F. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics, Harvard University (1997/98). Recent publications are a commentary to David Hume (On Morality), Frankfurt am Main, 2007 and "Distortions of Normativity", co-authored with J. David Velleman, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2010.
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Augustine's Question and The Case of Sounds

Thorben Petersen

In this talk, I will relate certain issues in the ontology of time with certain issues in the ontology of sound. My general aim is to examine how different conceptions of the nature of time's passage fare in the light of the phenomenon of sound.

There are different answers to the question "What is time?", depending on how the question is intended to be taken. On one interpretation, it demands some information concerning the status of temporal metrics, but the most intriguing interpretation in the vicinity surely is an Augustinian request for the nature of time's passage (cf. Saint Augustine, Confessions; XI.17). But even on this restriction, there are vastly different accounts to be found in the literature. Adherents of psychologism argue, in some way or other, that passage is nothing but a figment of the mind. For example, if someone reasons psychologistic about passage, she may tell you that all talk of time passing is constructed from spatial metaphors, and that the corresponding impression is literally produced by certain neurophysiological mechanisms. A venerable tradition, by contrast, defends the view that time's passage is an altogether mind-independent, albeit brute and inexplicable feature of the world. Thus passagists maintain that time would pass even if no one was there to recognize, but at the same time hold that this phenomenon is too basic to allow for further elucidation. But there are further options available in logical space, most notably the view that passage is neither subjective, nor fundamental. In this vein, neo-Aristotelians suggest that passage is ontologically dependent upon changes to enduring individuals.

The competing views fare well in certain respects, but less so in certain others. In the context of fundamental physics, for example, psychologism may seem unrivalled because of active and passive transformation rules, or the explanatory success of substantivalist conceptions of mechanics. A further instructive test case, to be run in this talk, is the phenomenon of sound (another one may be the case of music). In order to examine these theories' explanatory capacity vis-a-vis sounds, I also need to address certain issues in the ontology of sound. For according to some, sounds are identical to waves in a medium, while others hold that sounds are secondary qualities akin to colours and tastes (cf. Pasnau (1999), and the symposium in Zimmerman

(2010)). And still others challenge both of these fairly standard views for holding that there is something distinctively temporal about sound (cf. O'Callaghan (2007)). In the course of this talk I shall examine, which combinations between theories of time and theories of sound are possible, and which of these are plausible.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Laurenz Hudetz
Date:	11:45-12:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 101

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Alief and Experimental Philosophy

Natalia Anna Pietrulewicz

robably most famous research done by Experimental Philosophers focuses on Epistemology and Intentional Action.Typically, such a studies involve presenting informants ("ordinary people") with scenario, asking them simple yes-no questions about it (eg. "Did X know that Y?" or "Did Z do P intentionally?") and then, basing on the answers, ascribing to informants certain beliefs. Experimental research seems to suggest (sometimes contradictorily) that intuitions regarding 1) attribution of knowledge to some character in a given scenario and 2) attribution of intentionality, depend on the choice of features like: stake, salience, personal cost, vividness,

skills of the agent, polarity of the outcome, affect, blame etc.(eg. Buckwalter 2010, Stanley 2005, May et all 2005, Feltz&Zarpentine 2010, Phelan, Naddelhofer 2006, Guglielmo&Malle, Mallon 2009, Machery, Knobe 2003).

However interesting, I am not convinced whether studies manage to proof authors stance. In my critical examination of them, I am going to draw attention to the notion of "alief". Alief, built in the opposition to "belief", as defined by its author - Tamar Gendler is "to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way". I am going to show, that having alief with its purely explanatory power we have everything needed to explain experimental results. In particular, I will argue, that any attempt to ascribe to the participants of experimental studies certain beliefs (eg. the belief that that an agent in the scenario committed a deed intentionally) fails, since there is available more basic notion of alief.

In my talk I will start from more detailed introduction of Gendler's notion, critically examining it and seeking for redundancy, especially in light of the psychological concepts. Then I move to examination of chosen studies, closing with some general remarks on surveying folks' intuitions.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Sebastian Müller
Date:	14:45-15:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 107

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Natalia Anna Pietrulewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland)
Natalia Pietrulewicz (MA, phil.). PhD student at University of Warsaw. 2012 master in philosophy, 2011 baccalaureate in philosophy; theses concerning experimental philosophy and donkey anaphora. Conferences in philosophy of language, education and popularization of philosophy.
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Prolegomena for a Kantian Formal Theory of Space

Riccardo Pinosio

ant's formal logic has traditionally been considered as "terrifyingly narrow-minded and mathematically trivial" (Hazen, A., 1999, "Logic and Analyticity," in A.C. Varzi (ed.), The Nature of Logic, Stanford, CA: CSLI, pp. 79-110). This negative assessment can be traced back to Frege's "Begriffschrift", where, in light of the then newly developed symbolic logic, it is argued that Kant's logic is plagued by irremediable defects, such as, e.g., the reliance on the obsolete Aristotelian subject-predicate framework, the distinction between the negative and infinite judgment, between the categorical and hypotetical judgment, et cetera.

Recently, however, some philosophers have challenged this received view. Achourioti and van Lambalgen (T. Achourioti and M. van Lambalgen (2011). A formalization of Kant's Transcendental Logic. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 4, pp 254-289), (T. Achourioti and M. van Lambalgen (forthcoming). Kant and Logical Theory, Oxford University Press), building on Longuenesse's hermeneutical work (B. Longuenesse (1998), Kant and the Capacity to Judge, Princeton University Press), have developed a formalization of Kant's transcendental logic in terms of contemporary mathematics. They argue that the logical form of Kant's judgments and their intended semantics are inherently more complex than what is generally believed, and that it is thus misguided to interpret transcendental logic in light of classical logic. According to their interpretation, transcendental logic constitutes a non-classical formal logic in its own right, where the logical forms of judgments can be identified with the geometric fragment of first-order logic, while the intended semantics of objects of synthesis is captured by means of inverse systems of first-order models. The outcome of the formalization is that Kant's table of judgments is sound and complete with respect to its intended semantics.

According to Kant, transcendental logic differs from general logic in that the former does not abstract from the cognition of the object, i.e., it is a logic by means of which the spatio-temporal objects of experience are actually constructed from the material of appearances. Achourioti and van Lambalgen's formalization in (T. Achourioti and M. van Lambalgen (2011). A formalization of Kant's Transcendental Logic. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 4, pp 254-289) does not explic-

itly represent spatial nor temporal information. In order to improve the formalization of Kant's transcendental logic, it becomes thus necessary to obtain a better formal understanding of Kant's theory of space-time. Achourioti and van Lambalgen (T. Achourioti and M. van Lambalgen (forthcoming). Kant and Logical Theory, Oxford University Press.) have attempted to develop a formalization of Kant's notion of time as pure intuition. According to Longuenesse, the Transcendental Analytics, in its chapter on the synthesis speciosa, is supposed to explain how the intuitions of space and time, which in the Transcendental Aesthetics had been presented as given, must instead be seen as produced, or constructed by the subject by means of imagination. Relying on this interpretation, Achourioti and van Lambalgen propose a formalization in which the Kantian temporal continuum is constructed from given appearances by means of the action of the categories, which are interpreted as functions for the ordering of these appearances, while formally they are nothing else than functors between categories (in the categoy theory sense).

The purpose of this talk is to present a paper extending the formal analysis to the intuition of space. In particular, we shall argue that Kant sharply distinguished between "metaphysical" space and geometrical space, where the ground of the distinction lies in the fact that metaphysical space is characterized by means of purely topological properties, while geometrical space requires the construction of geometrical concepts. The topological properties that characterize metaphysical space are (i) unity, (ii) infinity, (iii) continuity, (iv) dimnesionality.

We shall analyse in detail Kant's rendition of these topological notions, and we shall examine, in light of contemporary mathematics, other importantant aspects of Kant's theory of space such as the notions of boundary, part and whole, contact and location, as well as the role of the categories in the construction of the spatial continuum. The outcome of the paper is to provide precise guidelines as to how a Kantian formal theory of space must look like, and to investigate possible formal correlates of Kant's spatial notions. This work thus provides the philosophical groundwork for a subsequent paper, currently under development, in which the mathematical theory is to be fully developed.

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Riccardo Pinosio (MSc Logic). Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam. 2010 BA in philosophy (thesis on the Church-Fitch knowability paradox). 2012 MSc in Logic (thesis on Kant's theory of space and constructive Euclidean geometry). I work mostly on the following two topics: (I) formal theories of space-time from a phenomenological and computational perspective (spatial logics, mereotopologies, etc) (II) non-classical logics as models of reasoning (counterfactuals, defeasible reasoning).
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Normative Wesen in einer natürlichen Welt

Bastian Reichardt

Der Naturalismus stellt ein Weltbild dar, das nicht nur charakteristisch für unsere Zeit ist, sondern sich in verschiedenen Epochen der Philosophiegeschichte immer wieder aufs Neue anbietet. Was man dabei auch immer wieder aufs Neue beobachten kann, ist, dass solche naturalistischen Weltbilder - welche dann gerne auch zum Szientismus oder sogar zum Physikalismus pervertiert werden - stets prominent sind, wenn die Naturwissenschaften Erfolge vorweisen können, die sich bis tief in unser gewohntes Denken auswirken. Was diese naturalistischen Ansätze ebenfalls preisgeben, ist das Fehlen eines einheitlichen naturalistischen Konzepts. Ob mit

dem Term "Naturalismus" eine ontologische oder eine methodologische These gemeint ist, bleibt bis heute strittig. Dabei herrscht ein immenser Unterschied zwischen der Ansicht, dass alles, was es gibt, durch die Naturwissenschaften erfassbar ist und der Ansicht, dass uns die Naturwissenschaften eine bewährte methodische Richtschnur für objektive Begründungsstrategien an die Hand legen.

Betrachten wir die Herausforderungen, die naturalistische Konzeptionen in der Ethik stellen, wird schnell klar, dass ein strikter Naturalismus auf eine Unvereinbarkeit mit dem personalen Standpunkt praktischer Akteure hinausläuft. Während deren Handlungen wesentlich Objekte der Zuschreibung moralischer Prädikate sind, schließen die ontologischen Rahmenbedingungen des strikten Naturalismus aus, dass solche Prädikate gehaltvoll sein können. Will man jedoch dem Naturalismus und dem stabilen moralischen Diskurs gleichermaßen Rechnung tragen, so bietet sich eine Verbindung zwischen einem gemäßigten methodischen Naturalismus und verschiedenen Spielarten des moralischen Konstruktivismus an. Der Konstruktivismus sichert Objektivität in der Ethik, ohne dabei die engen ontologischen Grenzen des Naturalismus zu überschreiten. Um dies darzustellen, werde ich verschiedene Kriterien eines methodischen Naturalismus entwickeln und ihre mögliche Kompatibilität mit konstruktivistischen Moraltheorien erwägen.

Section:	Ethics & Political Philosophy
Language:	German
Chair:	Marcel Warmt
Date:	16:00-16:30, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 104

Bastian Reichardt (University of Bonn, Germany)
Bastian Reichardt (M.A.) studied Philosophy and German in Bonn. He is Lecturer at the University of Bonn and Researcher at the Institute of Ethics in the Neurosciences (Forschungszentrum Jülich). He is the editor of "Juventas - Zeitschrift für junge Philosophie" (Bonn: Bernstein since 2011) and "Freges Philosophie nach Frege" (Münster: mentis 2013 (together with A. Samans)).
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Die kausale Exklusion des Mentalen

Matthias Rolffs

Das Argument der kausalen Exklusion des Mentalen (vgl. Kim (1993), Kim (1998)) nimmt eine zentrale Stellung in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie des Geistes ein. Es scheint zu zeigen, dass der nicht-reduktive Physikalismus letztlich kein gangbarer Weg zur Lösung des Problems der mentalen Verursachung ist.

Die wichtigsten Prämissen des Arguments sind eine Geschlossenheitsthese und ein Überdeterminationsverbot. Die Geschlossenheitsthese besagt, dass physikalische Ereignisse oder Eigenschaften hinreichende physikalische Ursachen haben. Das Überdeterminationsverbot schließt aus, dass sie darüber hinaus noch andere Ursachen haben. Gemeinsam implizieren die beiden Prämissen, dass physikalische Ereignisse oder Eigenschaften keine nicht-physikalischen Ursachen haben. Wer die beiden Prämissen also akzeptiert, muss entweder einen reduktiven Physikalismus oder einen Epiphänomenalismus akzeptieren. Entweder, mentale Ereignisse und Eigenschaften können physikalische Ereignisse und Eigenschaften verursachen. Dann müssen sie selbst physikalisch sein. Oder aber sie können keine physikalischen Ereignisse und Eigenschaften verursachen. Dann handelt es sich um bloße Epiphänomene.

Bei der genaueren Ausformulierung des Arguments stößt man auf einige Probleme. Man muss sehr auf das verwendete Vokabular achten, um die Reichweite des Arguments einschätzen zu können. Formuliert man es etwa in Bezug auf Ereignisse, so sind zahlreiche Positionen, die eindeutig als nicht-reduktionistisch einzuschätzen sind, nicht betroffen. Formuliert man es hingegen in Bezug auf Eigenschaften, so stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern diese überhaupt in Kausalrelationen auftreten können. Im Hintergrund steht hierbei die Frage nach den Relata der Kausalrelation, die von unterschiedlichen Philosophen in der Kausalitätsdebatte auf sehr unterschiedliche Weise beantwortet wird.

Eine weitere Unklarheit besteht in der genauen Deutung der Geschlossenheitsthese und der darin verwendeten Begriffe. Wie lässt sich etwa der Begriff des Physikalischen bestimmen? Auch aus der Beantwortung dieser Frage ergeben sich wichtige Konsequenzen für die Reichweite des Arguments. Hat man einen recht engen Begriff des

Physikalischen, ist eine große Klasse von Eigenschaften (oder Ereignissen) betroffen. Biologische oder sogar makrophysikalische Eigenschaften können dann nicht als Ursachen von (mikro-)physikalischen Eigenschaften (oder Ereignissen) auftreten. Verwendet man hingegen einen sehr weiten Begriff des Physikalischen, ist es gegebenenfalls gar nicht mehr klar, warum mentale Eigenschaften zunächst nicht unter den Begriff des Physikalischen fallen.

In meinem Vortrag möchte ich verschiedene Versionen des Exklusionarguments formulieren und hinsichtlich ihrer Reichweite und Plausibilität bewerten.

Literatur
Kim, Jaegwon (1993): Supervenience and Mind. Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	German
Chair:	Sebastian Müller
Date:	14:00-14:30, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 107

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Matthias Rolffs (University of Bonn, Germany)
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Real Possibilities and Potentialities

Antje Rumberg

n our everyday lives, we constantly encounter real possibilities. They are the kind of alternative future possibilities we are facing in an indeterministic world. Those real possibilities arise from concrete local circumstances, and they are compatible with our laws of nature. They are most adequately pictured within branching frameworks, such as provided by the Prior-Thomason theory of branching time. In my talk, I will present a dynamic modal explanation of branching models for real possibility that elucidates why the possible courses of events those models depict are compatible with our laws of nature. Branching will be explained in terms of the local arrangement of objects and their potentialities.

In the framework of branching time, our world is pictured as a tree of histories branching into multiple possible futures. More formally, one posits a backwards-linear connected partial ordering of moments. The branching structures defined that way can be employed in the semantics of modal-temporal languages if a valuation on the structure is provided. Each branching structure allows, however, for several valuations, and not every valuation yields a model for real possibility. What makes a branching model a model for real possibility is that all its possible courses of events are compatible with our laws of nature.

In order to explain why a branching model is a model for real possibility, some link between the structure and its valuation needs to be established. Given the valuation at a moment, we need a local explanation that elucidates why the possible future continuations of that moment are compatible with our laws of nature. I will suggest a modal explanation of branching in terms of potentialities. The fact that histories branch at a certain moment in a certain way will be accounted for by the potentialities of the objects existing at that moment and their local arrangement. The branching model as a whole will be built up step by step from the local future possibilities grounded in the potentialities of objects. In this way, we get a dynamic picture of real possibility: some possibilities disappear and new possibilities emerge as time progresses.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Laurenz Hudetz
Date:	09:00-09:30, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 101

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Freges Kritik am Psychologismus und Kants transzendentaler Idealismus

Alexander Samans

Die Argumente die Frege gegen seine psychologistischen Gegner formuliert lassen sich in zwei Aspekten unterscheiden.

1. Zum einen argumentiert Frege gegen einen naturalistischen Reduktionismus, dessen Ziel es ist, die Gesetze des logischen Schließens mit den Mitteln empirischer Psychologie zu erklären. Die Gesetze des richtigen Schließens können nicht die Gesetze des wirklichen Schließens sein. Die Gesetze des wirklichen Schließens beschreibt die empirische Psychologie anhand von Gesetzen, die Logik als Physik des Denkens auffasst und so auf Basis von Naturgesetzen argumentiert. Naturgesetze wirken jedoch mit Notwendigkeit. Da es im Vollzug tatsächlicher mentaler Akte zu Fehlschlüssen kommen kann, lässt sich ein Widerspruch ableiten.

2. Frege argumentiert zum anderen gegen eine idealistische Auffassung, die nicht zwischen Vorstellungen und Vorgestelltem unterscheidet. Die Gesetze des richtigen Schließens gelten vollkommen unabhängig von den tatsächlichen mentalen Akten des wirklichen Schließens.

Freges Antipsychologismus lässt sich so als Verbindung aus Antinaturalismus und Antiidealismus analysieren.

Diese Analyse zeigt, dass Frege an eine Theorie logischer Gesetzmäßigkeit die Forderungen stellt, erstens keine Naturalistische und zweitens keine idealistische Position einzunehmen.

In der Kritik der reinen Vernunft macht Kant seine antipsychologistische Position explizit. Im Beitrag soll dargestellt werden wie sich die beiden Forderungen aus Freges Argumentation gegen den Psychologismus ergeben, und wie der transzendentale Idealismus diese einlösen kann.

Es wird sich zeigen das sich aus diesem Zusammenhang Konsequenzen sowohl für eine Rekonstruktion der kantischen Theorie als auch für die Rekonstruktion von Freges Argumenten gegen den Psychologismus ergeben.

Section:	History of Logic & Argumentation Theory
Language:	German
Chair:	Christian Wimmer
Date:	14:45-15:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 104

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Fictionalism and Philosophy of Psychiatry

Lovro Savić

"y aim in this essay is to raise the question "Is there such a thing as mental illness?"" Thomas Szasz once famously wrote "and to argue that there is not" (Szasz, 1960, p. 113), which resulted not only in "incredulous stares" among mental health professionals, but triggered psychiatric schism as well. Although Thomas Szasz didn't put the final nail in the coffin of psychiatry and other "misbehavioral sciences" (Szasz, 2008, p. 1), he undoubtedly undermined its basic subject matter and contributed to the development of an antipsychiatric atmosphere and the already ongoing debates about the existence of mental disorder. Almost simultaneously, with the emergence of philosophy of psychiatry, "an area of application, and also an area to test more abstract philosophical methods, accounts and theories" (Thornton, 2007, p. 1) has developed. In the light of these claims, this paper examines the possibility of application of fictionalist theory in dissolving mentioned debates about the existence of mental disorder. I will proceed as follows. In the first part, I will give a brief presentation of Szasz's argument from his famous paper The Myth of Mental Illness. According to his view, all the sentences that incorporate terms like "mental disorders", "ills of the psyche" and "mental illness" are false simply because mental illnesses do not exist. Moreover, it seems that Thomas Szasz provided fairly persuasive reasons for the acceptance of what I will call Szaszian eliminativism – abandoning all the talk about mental illnesses. In the second part, I will try to strengthen Szasz's position by addressing certain ontological difficulties to which the realist about mental illness might stumble upon. Finally, in the last part of the paper, I will try to show that we should take fictionalist attitude towards mental disorders and nevertheless keep the "psychiatric talk", because it is useful. In other words, I will advocate the same attitude we usually take towards useful fictions, tales and games: although fictional tales are all literally false, they are all in some aspect – useful. According to this view "a fictionalist must see something problematic about the relevant area of thought, [but] on the other hand, the fictionalist must see something valuable about the relevant region of thought. That is, the "good" feature that is available even when truth is absent" (Sainsbury, 2010, p. 176). After proposing fictionalism as a possible solution, I will try to show several benefits of this attitude.

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Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Tae-Kyung Kim
Date:	10:30-11:00, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 107

Lovro Savić (Centre for Croatian Studies - University of Zagreb, Croatia)
Lovro Savić is currently and undergraduate (BA) philosophy and history student at the Centre for Croatian Studies - University of Zagreb, Croatia. His main areas of interest are philosophy of psychiatry and bioethical aspects of psychiatry.
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Truth and Diagonalization

Thomas Schindler

In this paper we present a classical, disquotational theory of truth over Peano arithmetic that is ω-consistent and has the same deductive strength as Z_2^- , i.e. comprehension for all parameter-free $\prod_n^1$- and $\sum_n^1$-formulae (for every $n \in \omega$). The theory is obtained by restricting the T-schema to sentences "not obtained by diagonalization". This is done in a more or less syntactical fashion, without resorting to possible extensions of the truth predicate or some ground model. We will indicate why the existence of such a theory is philosophically interesting. In particular, we will argue that the present system is the first well-motivated and useful formal theory of truth that squares with the philosophical doctrine of minimalism, and that the theory goes a long way towards solving some problems that pertain to classical theories of truth in general. The latter is due to its deductive power. As the present system exceeds all of the previously existing theories in proof- theoretic strength by far, it "swallows" all of them. This enables us to enjoy all of the desirable features of the other truth theories, while avoiding some of their pitfalls at the same time.

Section:	Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Christine Schurz
Date:	12:15-12:45, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 104

Thomas Schindler (LMU Munich, Germany)
Thomas Schindler is a PhD fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. His works focuses on semantic and axiomatic theories of truth, on semantic paradoxes, and on the notion of semantical dependence.
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Generalising Logical Concepts: Partial Entailment and Partial Equivalence

Michael Schippers

According to Carnap, deductive logic may be regarded as the theory of the relation of logical consequence, and inductive logic as the theory of another concept which is likewise objective and logical, viz., degree of confirmation (Carnap 1962, p. 43). As is well known, in the preface to the second edition of his Logical Foundations of Probability (1962), Carnap distinguishes two concepts of confirmation: Firmness and increase in firmness. According to the firmness-based account, a proposition A confirms another proposition B iff the posterior probability of B given A exceeds the posterior of non-B given A. On the other hand, A incrementally confirms B iff the posterior probability of B given A exceeds the posterior probability of B given non-A. While the majority of accounts purporting to explicate the notions of partial entailment or partial equivalence focus on the incremental concept of confirmation, it seems clear that what Carnap had in mind is much more akin to the firmness-based account. Based on a set of adequacy constraints I prove a representation theorem to the effect that, given these constraints, the posterior-based account is uniquely determined (up to ordinal equivalence) as the only account that satisfies all desiderata.

In my talk I also consider various arguments that have been leveled for the incremental conception, and hence against Carnap's initial suggestion and I show in what way they are ill-founded. Consequently, in addition to defending Carnap's initial suggestion on partial entailment, I advocate a hitherto unaccounted probabilistic generalization of logical equivalence that at the same time is a promising contribution to the highly topical discussion on probabilistic measures of coherence.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Carlo Maria Cirino
Date:	16:00-16:30, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 105

Michael Schippers (University of Oldenburg, Department of Philosophy, Germany)
Michael Schippers (M.Ed.) studied Philsophy and Mathematics at the Universities of Osnabrück and Oldenburg (Germany). He is currently working on a PhD-thesis on probabilistic measures of coherence within the DFG-funded priority program "New Frameworks of Rationality".
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Incongruent Counterparts and Enantiomorphism

Aleksandar Simić

In my talk I will first present Kant's argument for the existence of absolute space, as laid out in his work "On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space" (1768). This argument is based on the existence of the phenomenon of incongruent counterparts. Incongruent counterparts are two physical objets with exactly similar properties, except for the fact they cannot occupy the same region of space. Some examples of these objects include human hands and feet, left and right screws, etc. In his argument Kant tries to show that orientation of left and right hand cannot be explained neither by their internal relation, nor by relations with external objects. Thus, Kant concludes, it must be shown by the existence of absolute space. In the second part, I will present Peter Remnant's argument against Kant's proof. In brief, Remnant tries to prove wrong Kant's supposition that if a hand was the sole object created in the universe it must have a determinate orientation. In other words Remnant claimed that even if the only object in the universe was a single hand, it's orientation would be, stricly speaking, indeterminate. I will explain Remnant's argument in more detail in my talk. In the third section, I will present how Graham Nerlich criticsed Remnant's argument as misguided, by proving that it presented a misunderstanding of Kant at best, and affirming his point at worst. Later I will show how Nerlich improved Kant's original argument by rephrasing it in terms of enantiomorphs. Finally, I will try to show why Remnant's criticism of Kant was right, and why Nerlich's both criticism of Remnant and im-

provement of Kant's original argument miss the mark. Using a thought experiment I will try to prove how a single hand in the universe, contrary to Nerlich's argument, can be shown to be either an enantiomorph or a homomorph.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Laurenz Hudetz
Date:	09:45-10:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 101

Aleksandar Simić (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia)
Aleksandar Simić. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. Currently 3rd year undergraduate (BA) student of Philosophy.
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Might there Be an Empty World?

Marco Simionato

n contemporary analytic philosophical debate, metaphysical nihilism is the thesis according to which there could have been nothing, i.e. a possible world with no concrete objects in it. My talk offers an argument to defend metaphysical nihilism, without appealing to the subtraction argument by Baldwin (T. Baldwin, "there might be nothing", Analysis, 56, 231-238,1996) or one of its versions.

II) My argument (say: meontological argument) has the following premises:

P1) "Nothing" can be used as a substantive, without making a logical mistake (see G. Priest, "Beyond the limits of thought", Oxford Clarendon Press, 2002).

P2) There is a totality (say t) which includes each existing entity

P3) The sentence O: "For all x, x is identical to itself (self-identical) if and only if it is different from what it is not (omnis determinatio est negatio)" is necessarily true, i.e. it is true in each possible world

P4) For all x, x exists IFF x is self-identical.

III) Meontological argument works as follow: if P2 is true, we may have an identity criterion to define t. By O, when you define something, you must distinguish it from what it is not. At first glance it seems you can distinguish it by saying that t is not any part of it (for example t is not "this table"). But this solution doesn't allow us to recognize t among false totalities. In fact even the totality of all the tables of this world is not "this table"; but the totality of all the tables is not the true totality t.

The only criterion of identity for t is the difference between t and something that does not belong to t, i.e. something that does not exist, i.e. "nothing". One can state that "nothing" must exist for making O true when one considers the determinatio t.

By P3:

N1) "t is not nothing" is true in each possible world.

Therefore:

N2) "Nothing exists" is true in each possible world, i.e. a world without any entity exists in each possible world.

(I will try to explain how a world can include another world.) Therefore metaphysical nihilism is true.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Alberto Tassoni
Date:	16:00-16:30, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Marco Simionato (University ca Foscari of Venice, Italy)
Marco Simionato is an Italian PhD student in philosophy at University ca Foscari of Venice, where he is developing a research project in metaphysics about metaphysical nihilism. He has been also visiting PhD student at University of Latvia in Riga. He is author of two books and some articles or chapters of books, also in international context. His research areas are: metaphysics of possible worlds, the puzzle of nothing, the difference beteween abstract and concrete objects, the question of absolute generality (absolutely unrestricted quantification and the existence of an all-inclusive domain).
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A Nice Arrangement of Non-Literal Meanings

Alexander auf der Straße

This paper deals with the dogma that words have literal meaning that can be specified independently from conversational contexts. It focuses on the Davidsonian approach to malapropisms. The paper sketches an alternative that provides explanations for malapropisms roughly along the lines of the (later) Davidsonian programme but requires no literal meaning. A usage-based framework will be presented, in which the meaning of a given word type derives from the sum of its actual, past instantiations. "Primary meaning" is characterized as the homogenous majority of these instantiations. Knowledge of meaning is based on expectations which, again, are rooted in acquaintance with typical patterns of language use. In this sense, the core of Davidson's theory remains: determining intended meaning is to integrate "prior" knowledge and knowledge gained in a particular conversational situation. Still, one's semantics is deflated in that it does not require traditional, lexical meaning. Also, the divide between prior/passing theory vanishes, for the "passing" theory seems to suffice to account for both pragmatic meaning and its alleged semantic basis.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Theresa Marx
Date:	15:30-16:00, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

Alexander auf der Straße (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)
Alexander auf der Straße (MA). Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf. 2011 Bachelor of Arts in philosophy and German linguistics (Ruhr-Universität Bochum). 2011 Master of Arts in Philosophy (Düsseldorf); thesis about adequacy constraints on functionalistic theories of mind. No publications but one on the Extended Mind hypothesis.
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Presentism Entails the Stage View

Alberto Tassoni

I look to investigate what metaphysic of material objects one should associate with presentism—the view that only present objects exist—and defend the view that presentism can only be coupled with the stage view—the view that objects are stages (ie. that they exist only momentarily). I proceed as follows: I firstly present and discuss the widely held association of presentism with endurantism, the view that (i) objects persist and (ii) have no temporal parts. I develop (i) in terms of location, and present the two versions of endurantism that emerge from this development: Multilocation Theory (MT) and Extended Simples Theory (ES). According to (MT), objects are exactly located at multiple times, and according to (ES), objects are mereological atoms and have only one exact location. Briefly, (MT) is incompatible with presentism because it is not the case that an object can be located at times that do not exist, and (ES) because (ES) implies that objects have a fourdimensional exact location, but location cannot be temporally extended because to be temporally extended is to occupy different times, and there are no times except the present.

I then turn to the association of presentism with the worm view, the view according to which objects have temporal parts as well as spatial ones. I think that this association is also erroneous, and I offer new arguments against the conjunction of presentism with the worm view from Extensional Mereology.

In light of all this, I derive the criteria about location that are consistent with presentism: from the incompatibility of presentism with (MT) we have learnt that the exact location of an object must be (a) unique (ie. it should not violate Functionality, the principle according to which objects have only one exact location), and from the incompatibility of presentism with (ES) and the worm view we have learnt that the exact location of an object must be (b) threedimensional. I then show how the stage view meets (a) and (b). Finally, I briefly sketch the presentist stage view and reply to some objections. I conclude that, given the inconsistency of presentism with all the other views about material objects, it seems to be rather safe to associate presentism with the stage view. Thus, presentism entails the stage view.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Luca Gili
Date:	14:45-15:15, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

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Alberto Tassoni (University College London, United Kingdom)
Alberto Tassoni earned the Italian Scientific Diploma last July with top marks, and has been awarded the prize for "Best Maturità" relative to that. He started his Philosophy BA at University College London last September, and he has just concluded his first year with a congratulatory departmental award for excellent performance. He is currently working on philosophy of time, grounding, mereology and location.
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Revisiting Brouwer – Minimal Intuitionism

Andrea Tenuta

The aim of this work is to show that a new reading of Brouwer's philosophical thought could be useful to fulfill the necessity of a philosophical account of intuition for intuitionism. To avoid the circularity argument formulated by Richard Dedekind an intuitionist is compelled to claim that in his definition of natural numbers the idea of keeping going, i.e. keeping following the arrows of the counting algorithm, is immediately intelligible and does not presuppose any grasp of eternity. To make this statement true a philosophical account of intuition is needed: the idea of keeping going can be immediately understandable only if we have the intuition that the process of construction can be continued infinitely. Brouwer tried to explain this in terms of temporal intuition but his philosophy is

often rejected due to some structural problems such as irreflexivity, solipsism, psychologism and subjectivism. In the past twenty years attempts have been made to use the phenomenological method to overcome these difficulties. Philosophers like Richard Tieszen and Mark van Atten, using the Husserlian notion of intuition, answer the critics by interpreting Brouwer's creative subject as the phenomenological transcendental subject. In this work I will try to show that this kind of intuition, in which to intuit something means to present directly and immediately the object, is not suitable for intuitionism, since it makes it impossible to state a precise limit between constructive and non-constructive objects. Therefore, it is necessary to return to Brouwer's conception of intuition, which is a productive one, trying to solve all the problems exposed earlier. This is precisely what my efforts aim to. I believe that it is possible to read Brouwer in transcendental terms without using the Husserlian notion of intuition. Interpreting the intuition productively the minimal intuitionism answers easily to the charges of psychologism, subjectivism and solipsism. It also succeeds in solving the problem of irreflexivity modifying Brouwer's notion of two-ity: this is no more read in terms of temporal relation between sensations but in terms of an act-content relationship, thematized through an intentional act of reflection.

Section:	Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Christine Schurz
Date:	11:45-12:15, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 104

Andrea Tenuta (Catholic University of Milan, Italy)
Andrea Tenuta (MA phil.). Catholic University of Milan. 2010 baccalaureate in Philosophy, thesis about the infinity in mathematics; 2013 master of arts in Logic and Philosophy of Science; thesis about the foundation of intuition in the intuitionism.
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Konsequentialismus: Eine Drei-Ebenen-Theorie

Marcel Warmt

Für welche Handlung soll sich ein moralischer Akteur entscheiden, wenn er nicht weiß, welche Handlung gemäß seiner Theorie moralisch richtig ist? In meinem Vortrag werde ich diese Frage aus einer konsequentialistischen Perspektive diskutieren.

Grundsätzlich lassen sich zwei verschiedene Situationstypen unterscheiden, bei denen der moralische Akteur nicht erkennen kann, welche Handlung moralisch richtig ist:

(1) Dem moralische Akteur stehen nicht alle relevanten Informationen zur Bestimmung der moralisch richtigen Handlung zur Verfügung, er hat jedoch genügend Zeit, um seine Handlungsalternativen gründlich zu durchdenken.

(2) Dem moralischen Akteur stehen nicht alle relevanten Informationen zur Verfügung und zudem hat er nicht genügend Zeit, um seine Handlungsalternativen gründlich zu durchdenken.

Während beispielsweise Hare seine Zwei-Ebenen-Theorie am zweiten Situationstyp ausgerichtet hat, hat Feldman jüngst eine Zwei-Ebenen-Theorie am ersten Situationstyp ausgerichtet. In meinem Vortrag werde ich die These vertreten, dass eine angemessene Beantwortung der Eingangsfrage situationsspezifisch erfolgen muss. Das Ziel des Vortrags besteht in der Verteidigung, einer daraus resultierenden konsequentialistischen Drei-Ebenen-Theorie:

Ebene 1: Moralisch richtig1 ist eine Handlung genau dann und nur dann, wenn sie das tatsächliche Wohlergehen langfristig maximiert.

Ebene 2: Wenn du nicht bestimmen kannst, welche Handlung moralisch richtig1 ist, aber genügend Zeit hast, um zu bestimmen, welche Handlung aus der konsequentialistischen Entscheidungsprozedur folgt, dann ist diejenige Handlung, die aus der konsequentialistischen Entscheidungsprozedur folgt moralisch richtig2.

Ebene 3: Wenn du nicht bestimmen kannst, welche Handlung moralisch richtig1 ist und nicht genügend Zeit hast, um zu bestimmen, welche Handlung aus der konsequentialistischen Entscheidungsprozedur folgt, dann ist diejenige Handlung, die aus deinen Prima-Facie-Prinzipien folgen, moralisch richtig3.

Section: Ethics & Political Philosophy
Language: German
Chair: Julia Apollonia Engels
Date: 15:30-16:00, September 13th, 2013 (Friday)
Location: HS 104

Marcel Warmt (Universität Kassel, Germany)
Doktorand/Promotionsstudent an der Universität Kassel im Fach Philosophie. Arbeitstitel der Dissertation: Nähe und Distanz als Kriterium moralischer Pflichten
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Freie W-Logik

Christian Wimmer

ine Wittgensteinsche Logik (kurz W-Logik) zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass sie gleich ausdrucksstark ist wie eine herkömmliche Prädikatenlogik mit Identität, obwohl im Rahmen der W-Logik auf Identität verzichtet wird. Die W-Logik folgt der Idee Wittgensteins: "Gleichheit des Gegenstandes drücke ich durch Gleichheit des Zeichens aus, und nicht mit Hilfe eines Gleichheitszeichens. Verschiedenheit der Gegenstände durch Verschiedenheit der Zeichen." (5.53)

Die Besonderheit der W-Logik besteht in ihren Quantoren. Vom Wertebereich einer gebundenen Variable x werden diejenigen Werte ausgeschlossen, die Werte von freien Variablen sind, die im Bereich eines Quantors vokommen. Dies betrifft in weiterer Folge die Individienkonstanten. Um die gleiche Ausdrucksstärke wie in einer Prädikatenlogik zu bewahren, wird deshalb eine Koreferenzprädikat eingeführt. Ziel dieses Vortrag ist es zu zeigen, inwiefern man eine W-Logik adaptieren kann, um eine Freie W-Logik zu erhalten.

Section:	Logic & Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	German
Chair:	Christine Schurz
Date:	09:00-09:30, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 104

Christian Wimmer (Universität Salzburg, Austria)
Christian Wimmer, Mag.phil. 2010 Universität Salzburg mit einer Arbeit über Free Logic, derzeit: Dissertation Universität Salzburg über Free Logic
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On Rudolf Carnap's Aufbau and its Interpretations

Rafal Wodzisz

In my talk I deal with the topic, which gained its importance in 1990s. At that time scholars such as Alan Richardson and Michael Friedman raised the question about the way in which Rudolf Carnap's "Der logische Aufbau der Welt" should or can be interpreted. More importantly they raised several objections against the received view of Carnap's early work and pointed out to a wider variety of inspirations that influenced him. The received view was established mainly by Wilard V. O. Quine, Alfred J. Ayer and Nelson Goodman. All three of them read Aufbau as an attempt to realise empiricists project formulated at the beginning of 20th century by Bertrand Russell. That is the ground of the phenomenalist, reductionist reading of the discussed book. This view focuses on the particular constitutional system developed by Carnap in Aufbau. Friedman and Richardson on the other hand persuade quite convincingly that Carnap's aim was more general and consisted of creating a constitutional theory, a methodology of creating all sorts of systems, and that phenomenalist system presented in the book serves only as an exemplification. I carry on the task to support Friedman and Richardson's views in the following order. Firstly, I will present the project of Aufbau. Secondly, I will give an account of classical interpretations of Aufbau. Thirdly, modern interpretations of the given book will be described. Finally, I will attempt to discuss a change that occurred with respect to the reception of Aufbau, i.e. a shift from classical to modern interpretations.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Alberto Tassoni
Date:	17:30-18:00, September 12th, 2013 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Rafal Wodzisz (John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland)
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On Donald Davidson's Theory of Action Individuation

Marta Zareba

The aim of my presentation is to critically analyse and examine Donald Davidson's account of internalist minimalism, which emerged during the discussion about the individuation of actions. My considerations will concern with a detailed analysis of Davidson's theory of action, with a special attention to the key elements of this proposal like the account of (i) the nature of human actions (viewed as events under a certain description, i.e. events which can be described as movements of the agent's body), (ii) the minimalistic criteria of action individuation, (iii) the criteria of differentiation between actions and mere happenings (the concept of intentional action), (iv) the account of necessary and sufficient conditions for agency.

The second part of my presentation will offer a reconstruction of several objections against this view formulated by adherents of the externalist positions (J.J. Thomson, I. Thalberg, L. Davis) regarding actions as events extending in time and space beyond the agent's body. Therefore, I will present the temporal problem argument formulated in favour of externalism. This argument is designed to show that Donald Davidson's method of action individuation leads us to some counterintuitive statements (e.g. implying that the killings occur before the death of the victim).

The main goal of my talk is to show that externalist objections can be refuted, if we take Davidson's ontology of events and his concept of action seriously. A set of arguments will be presented to justify the claim that Davidson's account of action can serve as a valuable theory with a great explanatory power.

Section:	Metaphysics & Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Thorben Petersen
Date:	15:30-16:00, September 14th, 2013 (Saturday)
Location:	HS 101

Marta Zareba (Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland)
Marta Zareba (MA phil.), postgraduate researcher at the Department of Epistemology, University of Warsaw; 2011 master in philosophy; thesis about the debate on action individuation; interested in the analytic philosophy of action, ontology and philosophy of mind.
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